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Commentators sometimes recognize Delaware's preeminence in corporate law, but
they almost invariably treat Delaware's recent popularity as a bankruptcy venue
choice as raising entirely different issues. In fact, the two are integrally related.
Specifically, just as the efforts of Delaware and other states to attract corpora-
tions-a process often referred to as "charter competition'-has induced Delaware
to regulate corporate law in a generally efficient manner, the same forces will have
a beneficial effect on Delaware's bankruptcy judges.
-Professor David Skeet'
INTRODUCTION
Since edging out New Jersey in the 1920s, Delaware has
been the jurisdiction of choice for the incorporation of large, public
companies. For almost half that length of time, legal scholars have
debated whether Delaware won its victory in a "race to the top" or a
"race to the bottom" among the competing states.2 Scholars writing
from an economic perspective have generally concluded that incor-
poration in Delaware must benefit society as a whole because all of
the interested parties-the various stakeholders in corporations-
freely join in webs of contracts that include incorporation in Dela-
ware. 3 The empirical evidence supporting this conclusion, however,
is not evidence tending to show that Delaware corporate law is effi-
cient. Rather, it is merely evidence showing that corporate actors
1. David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1998).
2. The seminal article is William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism
and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168
(1999) (reaffirming much of Cary's analysis).
3. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories
and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 546 (1984) (presenting the argument that if everyone
agreed to it, it must be good); id. at 549-50 (arguing that charter competition is a race to the top);
Daniel R. Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). But see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 HARe. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (arguing from an economic perspective
that the race tends to be to the top with respect to certain identifiable issues and to the bottom
with respect to others).
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and investors believe it to be efficient.4 This Article presents em-
pirical evidence that during the early 1990s the various
stakeholders in distressed, large public companies freely joined in
webs of contracts that included bankruptcy reorganization in Dela-
ware, and that their belief was in fact erroneous. During that pe-
riod, Delaware was not the best jurisdiction in which to reorganize,
but one of the worst.
Although large, public companies incorporated in Delaware
have been free to choose the Delaware bankruptcy court for their
reorganizations at least since 1979,5 only a single one did so during
the decade of the 1980s. 6 That changed abruptly in the early 1990s,7
4. The principal studies are by Daines, Romano, and Dodd & Leftwich. See generally Rob-
ert Daires, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? (Columbia Law School, Working Paper No.
159) (showing that investors pay more for Delaware firms than for non-Delaware firms having
the same book value); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Un-
healthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980); Roberta Romano, Law as
a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzle, 1 J.L ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
Professor Romano's data are from two sources. The first is a set of questionnaires mailed to
corporate actors asking the reasons their corporations did or did not reincorporate in Delaware.
Romano, supra, at 242-43. The second is an event study of the movements in stock prices around
the time of reincorporation. Id. at 265-73. Professors Dodd & Left%ich's data is an event study
similar to Romano's. Dodd & Leftwhich, supra, at 259. The questionnaire data reflect only the
perceptions of corporate actors as to whether reincorporation to Delaware would be efficient
The event study data are one step further removed from the issue ultimately to be resolved.
Those data rely on the additional inference that movements in stock prices reflect investors'
opinions as to the desirability of incorporation in Delaware as a means of proving those opinions
exist. Neither set of data bears on the efficiency of Delaware incorporation until one makes one of
two additional assumptions. The first is that corporate actors and investors are in fact capable
of assessing legal regimes. The second is that the market prices of securities reflect the intrinsic
value of those securities.
We do not mean to imply that the secondary nature of the empirical evidence is all that pre-
vents it from proving the efficiency of Delaware incorporation. Professor Lucian Bebchuk lists
other reasons why the empirical evidence should not be considered conclusive. Bebchuk, supra
note 3, at 1449-50.
5. Skeel, supra note 1, at 15 (explaining the history and concluding that "bankruptcy law-
yers simply did not think to file in Delaware").
6. The single company reorganizing in Delaware was Phoenix Steel-a steel manufacturer
whose headquarters and operations were located in Delaware. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Pub-
licly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L, REV. 11, 59-63 (listing the large, public bankruptcies filed
and confirmed from October 1979 to March 1988); Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Data-
base (2000) (listing all large public bankruptcy cases filed from 1980 to 2000) (on file with Pro-
fessor LoPucki, in Microsoft Access format).
Professor David Skeel has argued that Delaware dominated state corporate reorganization
prior to the bankruptcy legislation of the 1930s, through its "expert handling of equity receiver-
ship cases." Skeel, supra note 1, at 8 C(Delaware's primacy also extended to corporate reorganiza-
tions."). Although equity receiverships were not bankruptcy cases and did not proceed in bank-
ruptcy courts, they were functional equivalents.
7. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 983-87
(1999) (providing an empirical description of the shift).
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when Delaware suddenly replaced New York City8 as the jurisdic-
tion of choice for the bankruptcy reorganization of large, public
companies. Delaware's ascendancy was swift, reaching its peak in
1996, when twelve of the fourteen large public companies that filed
for reorganization in the United States (86%) did so in Delaware.9
Threatened with a political backlash from bankruptcy lawyers and
judges throughout the remainder of the United States, the Chief
Judge of the Delaware District Court intervened to slow the filings
in January, 1997.10 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission
condemned the forum shopping and called for changes in the law to
prevent it.11
Just as leading corporate scholars writing from an economic
perspective proclaimed the efficiency of Delaware incorporation
nearly two decades ago, leading bankruptcy scholars writing from
that perspective now proclaim the efficiency of Delaware bank-
ruptcy reorganization. Professors Robert Rasmussen and Randall
Thomas argue that because prepackaged cases are consensual-
that is, the market chooses Delaware-prohibiting debtors from
filing prepackaged cases in Delaware would "decrease[ ] social
welfare." 12 Professor David Skeel argued that "the characteristics
that distinguished Delaware bankruptcy cases" were "speed and
efficiency, as well as sophistication." 13
Congress did nothing, principally because the senior senator
from Delaware, Joseph Biden, served on the committee that con-
trolled bankruptcy legislation in the Senate. 14 Today, over 60% of
8. When large, public companies filed for bankruptcy reorganization during the 1980s,
about thirty percent of them did so in the Manhattan Division Bankruptcy Court for the South-
ern District of New York. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 29 (reporting that thirteen of
forty-three cases proceeded in the New York City bankruptcy court). The remainder of the cases
were spread throughout the United States. Id. at 59-63 (listing cases).
9. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 985.
10. The intervention is described in Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 986, and dis-
cussed in Skeel, supra note 1, at 33-35 (suggesting that the intervention was a response to the
threat of venue legislation, but also describing other possible motives).
11. See NA'L. BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N., BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 770-87
(1997).
12. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1391 (2000).
13. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bank.
ruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1276 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 1, at 44 C'So long as Senator Biden stays on the committee,
even as a member of the minority, he can probably quell venue reform."); see also Rasmussen &
Thomas, supra note 12, at 1362 (describing Congressional maneuvering with regard to Delaware
bankruptcy venue).
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the bankruptcy reorganizations of large public companies filed in
the United States are filed in the Delaware bankruptcy court. 15
This Article reports on an empirical study of the outcomes of
the bankruptcy reorganizations that took place before and during
this historic shift. In this study, we tracked the 188 public compa-
nies that emerged from large bankruptcy reorganizations in the
United States from 1983 through 1996 and determined the fre-
quency with which they refiled for bankruptcy. Our study included
the first thirty-one companies to emerge from large, public company
bankruptcies in Delaware. By February 20, 2000-the close of data
collection for the empirical study reported in this Article-ten of
those thirty-one companies had filed a second bankruptcy case.
That refiling rate is similar to New York's refiling rate, but six to
seven times as high as the refiling rate for companies reorganizing
in all other United States bankruptcy courts.
Refiling constitutes a failure of the bankruptcy process.16
First, the Bankruptcy Code condemns the necessity for refiling.
Specifically, it provides that, as a condition of confirming the plan
in the first case, the court must find that "confirmation of the plan
is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor."17 Second, bankruptcy reor-
15. See LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 6 (data showing 62% of large,
public company bankruptcies filed in Wilmington). For this purpose, a company is considered
"large" if it has assets in excess of $100 million in 1980 dollars (a little over $200 million in cur-
rent dollars) and "public" if it is required to file annual reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
16. A number of writers have noted and commented critically on the high rates of bank-
ruptcy refiling. In a study of large, public company reorganizations in the 1980s, Professors
Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford found that twelve of the thirty-eight companies that
emerged from bankruptcy in their study (32%) had filed bankruptcy again by 1992. Lynn M.
LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 608 (1993). In another study published two years
later, Professor Edith Hotchkiss found a refailure rate of 32%. Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Post-
bankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 4, 7 (1995) (finding that 32% of
a sample of 197 public companies that emerged from bankruptcy reorganization filed between
October, 1979 and September, 1988 "are involved in a second bankruptcy or distressed restruc-
turing"). In a study of reorganizations and out-of-court restructurings occurring betwveen 1979
and 1989, Professor Stuart Gilson found that the recidivism rate for firms that restructure out of
court (35%) was higher than the recidivism rate for firms that reorganize under Chapter 11
(16%). Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Finan-
cially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161, 167-68 (1997). Other commentators have also noted and
criticized these high rates of refiling. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11
Bankruptcy-Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Susan F. Balaschak, Rehabili-
tation or Quick Fi "Chapter 22s", 1996 A.B.I. J. LEXIS 649 (Dec. 1996 / Jan. 1997); Allen Mi-
chel et al, Post-bankruptcy Operating Performance: Two-time Filers L's. One-time Filers, 2000
AB.I. J. LEXIS 36 (Mar. 2000).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).
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ganization is an expensive and disruptive process. For a large, pub-
lic company, the direct cost is probably about 1.5% to 6% of the
company's assets. 18 Those direct costs are typically several million
dollars for the companies studied and may run into the hundreds of
millions of dollars for the largest of them. 19 The indirect costs-
damage to the reputation of the company, distraction of
management, the loss of key employees, and the necessity to sell or
abandon promising projects-are generally assumed to be much
higher. When bankruptcy is repeated, these costs are incurred a
second time.
Paradoxically, large public companies in need of bankruptcy
reorganizations seem to be flocking to the courts least likely to re-
organize them successfully. The explanation cannot be simply that
management takes cases to Delaware to benefit shareholders at the
expense of creditors, because approximately half of the filings were
prepackaged cases in which the debtor sought and obtained the
creditors' consent to the filing, and several of the others were cases
in which shareholders stood to recover nothing anywhere. As we
argue below, at least part of the explanation seems to be that the
parties who stood to lose in a failed Delaware reorganization simply
underestimated the likelihood of failure. The "market" is not as
good at assessing legal regimes as theorists suppose.
Part I of this Article describes the methodology we employed
to calculate refiling rates. Part II sets forth our findings in more
detail. In addition to our findings of elevated Delaware and New
York refiling rates, we made a number of other findings. Companies
that had previously filed bankruptcy were more than four times as
likely to refile as were public companies to file initially. Refiling
rates were high for companies that emerged in the period before
about 1988, dipped for emergences during the period from 1988 to
1993, and reached record-high levels for the companies that
emerged in 1994 through 1996. The rate at which companies refiled
during their first year after confirmation was double the back-
18. Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question,
39 J. FIN. 1067, 1078 (1984) (finding direct costs of 6.2% of asset value); Tashjian et al., Prepaks:
An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 144 tbl.2 (1996)
(finding that the mean cost of prepackaged bankruptcy reorganization is 1.85% of the total book
value of assets); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Prior.
ity of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990) (finding mean direct cost of bankruptcy reorganization
was 2.8% to total book value of assets).
19. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post.
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 713 n.87 (1999) (noting fee of $200 million paid
to the English liquidators of BCCI).
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ground rate at which all public companies filed bankruptcy. The
refiling rate increased to about six times the background rate in the
third year after emergence, and then declined to about three times
the background rate. The refiling rate remained elevated for at
least eleven years after confirmation.
Part III discusses the implications of these findings for the
debates over Delaware reorganization, Delaware incorporation, and
bankruptcy forum shopping generally. The Article concludes that
the excessive rate of bankruptcy refiing by emerging companies
appears to be the product of a wasteful competition among courts.
Competing courts attract filings by applying lax standards for plan
confirmation that lead to the excessive refiling rates.
I. METHODOLOGY
A. The Companies Studied
The companies studied are all of the principal operating
companies emerging from bankruptcy reorganizations of large,
public companies filed after October, 1979 in United States bank-
ruptcy courts and in which plans were confirmed by December 31,
1996. The set of all large public companies that reorganized during
that period was identified from the Bankruptcy Research Database
(CBRD") maintained by one of the authors.20 The BRD included 271
cases filed during the period of the study. The disposition of seven
of those cases is unknown, 21 and twenty-four remained pending at
the end of the period. Of the 240 cases that reached a known dispo-
sition by December 31, 1996, eight (3.3%) converted to Chapter 7
without confirmation of a plan, seven (2.9%) liquidated under
Bankruptcy Code § 363 without confirmation of a plan,z one (0.4%)
was dismissed, and thirty-six (15%) were liquidated pursuant to a
confirmed plan without the emergence of an operating company. In
the remaining 188 cases (78.3%), at least one operating company
emerged from the reorganization. In a few of those cases, more than
20. For a description of the database, see Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 973-74. A
version is available online at http'/teddy.law.cornelLedu:8090ilopuckhtm.
21. These are generally older cases not followed by the press. They probably include a dis-
proportionate number of liquidations.
22. That section provides that a company in bankruptcy reorganization may, after notice
and a hearing, sell its property outside the ordinary course of business. The section has been
held to authorize the sale of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets outside the ordinary
course of business when there exists an "articulated business justification" for such a sale.
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir.
1983).
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one operating company emerged. In those few, we included the
largest emerging company in our study and excluded the others.
The result was a set of 188 emerging companies on which we cal-
culated all of the refiling rates described in this Article.
B. Calculation of the Refiling Rate
Comparing bankruptcy refiling rates across time, courts, and
other variables presents difficult methodological problems. "Ide-
ally," all emerging companies would be followed for the same length
of time, the number of bankruptcies in various subgroups divided
by the number of emerging companies in those subgroups, and the
quotients compared. Such a methodology, however, would suffer
from three debilitating problems. First, the necessity to wait for the
cases to resolve would limit the researchers to critiquing the bank-
ruptcy process as it existed many years earlier. Second, because
only relatively small numbers of large, public companies in any par-
ticular category emerge from reorganization each year, the "ideal"
methodology would also suffer from populations too small to reach
statistical significance. Third, emerging companies often cease their
separate existence without filing bankruptcy, making it impossible
to follow them for the chosen time period. The companies may be
acquired by, or merged with, other companies. They may cease
business and liquidate, or simply shrink in size until they become
untrackable.
Our strategy for dealing with the first two of these problems
was to include all reorganized companies in our study, regardless of
the length of time since they emerged from bankruptcy, and to draw
from the experience of each what value we could. Our strategy for
dealing with the third was to define a set of conditions for continu-
ing inclusion of cases in our study. We designed the conditions to
insure that the companies studied remained comparable to the
much larger population of public companies whose bankruptcy fil-
ing rate (the "background rate") provided our principal standard for
comparison. We "included" emerged companies in our study during
the period of time they met the conditions for comparability, and
permanently excluded them from the study after the first time they
ceased to meet the conditions. For ease of reference, we referred to
a company as "followed" during the time it qualified for inclusion in
the study, and as "dropped" at the time it ceased to meet the condi-
tions for comparability and we therefore ceased to include it. We
followed the companies not dropped to February 20, 2000, the date
on which we began our final data collection. Thus, for each of the
[Vol. 54:2:231238
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188 companies, our conditions established a finite period of follow-
ing, which began at confirmation of the plan in the first bankruptcy
case. Those periods ranged from a minimum of nine days to a
maximum of seventeen years.
We defined the "refiling rate" for a given year as the number
of followed companies filing bankruptcy during the year, divided by
the number of companies followed during that year. Thus, if four
companies refiled during a year in which we followed one hundred
companies, the refiling rate for that year was 4%. If we followed a
company for only a portion of the year, it was included in the de-
nominator for only that portion.23
C. Conditions of Comparability
We calculated "background" bankruptcy filing rates, which
are discussed in more detail in the next subpart, for the population
of all public companies, regardless of size. To assure comparability
between the companies followed and the companies used to calcu-
late the background rate, we dropped an emerging company from
the study if the company failed to file an annual report (Form 10-K)
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") for a period
of three consecutive years after emerging. Thus, for example, an
emerging company that filed its first and only annual report for a
year ending twenty months after confirmation was followed for
fifty-six months after confirmation. If that company filed bank-
ruptcy during its fifty-fifth month after confirmation, we included
its refiling in the refiling rates we report. If the company filed
bankruptcy during its fifty-seventh month after confirmation, we
did not include its refiling in the refiling rates we report. An
emerging company that never fied an annual report with the SEC
was followed for three years and dropped at the end of that period.
We applied the three-year grace period for several reasons.
First, the application of some grace period was necessary, because
the SEC sometimes exempts public companies from filing annual
23. To illustrate, we began following 188 companies as of the date each emerged from its
bankruptcy reorganization. During their first year after confirmation, two of these companies
(Vista Properties and SpectraVision) were acquired and three (Cook United, Value Merchants,
and Jamesway) refiled, leaving 183 companies in the study at the end of that year. To determine
the number of companies followed during the first year after confirmation, we added to the 183
companies that completed the entire year, the fractions of the year during which the other five
companies continued to qualify for inclusion-a total of 2.3 years. The sum, 185.3, was the num-
ber of companies followed during the first year after confirmation. Se infra Table 3.
20011
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reports in connection with bankruptcy. 24 Second, application of a
one- or two-year grace period might have understated the rate of
refiling as the result of adverse selection. Public companies often
cease filing annual reports during the period of financial distress
that precedes bankruptcy because they plan to file bankruptcy.
Third, application of the three-year grace period increased the total
company-years of following, which increased the reliability of our
study. We believe that it did so without sacrificing validity because
the emerging companies that did file 10-Ks refied at substantially
the same rate as the emerging companies that did not file 10-Ks.25
Because we were interested in the propensity to refile of only
self-reliant emerging companies, we dropped companies from the
study when they lost their separate identity through merger or ac-
quisition or when they ceased doing business and liquidated with-
out refiling. Because many of the mergers or acquisitions, and
probably all of the cessations of business, served as alternatives to
bankruptcy refiling for emerging companies with failing businesses,
the failure rates for emerging companies were undoubtedly much
higher than the refiling rates for those companies.
We did not drop emerging companies that engaged in two
kinds of acquisitions that did not deprive them of their separate
identities. In the first, the emerging company was acquired by an-
other company and then maintained as a separate subsidiary that
continued to file its own annual reports-that is, reports that did
not cover the acquirer-with the SEC. In the second, the emerging
company acquired another company in a transaction in which the
emerging company did not appear to us to lose its identity (that is,
a true acquisition).26
We dropped emerging companies from the study when they
refied bankruptcy because, so long as they remained in bank-
24. See Sea Galley Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 415 (Mar.
24, 1995) (authorizing company to cease filing annual reports during its bankruptcy proceedings
and to resume filings only for periods commencing after the company's release from bankruptcy).
25. To test this proposition, we compared the filing rate during the first three years after
emergence for the companies that did file at least one 10-K with those that did not. We found
that twenty-eight of the 163 companies that did file a 10-K during those three years (17.1%)
refiled during those three years, while four of the twenty-five companies that did not file a 10.K
during those three years (16.0%) refiled during those three years. Applying Fisher's exact test,
the difference is not statistically significant.
26. When a company is acquired in exchange for stock of the acquirer and then merged into
the acquirer, the effect may be the same regardless of which company is designated the acquirer
and which the target. By contrast, an acquirer that purchases the stock of a target for cash and
maintains the target as a subsidiary remains essentially the same company it was before the
acquisition. Between these two extremes lies a wide range of transactions with varying effects.
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ruptcy, they could not, as a practical matter, file again.2 Some re-
filings were cases that qualified for inclusion in the BRD and con-
cluded in the emergence of an operating company. The companies
emerging from those refilings were included in the study on the
same terms as any other emerging company. For example, AM In-
ternational emerged from the bankruptcy of a company with the
same name on September 11, 1984. We followed the emerged com-
pany for 8.7 years until it refied on May 17, 1993, and dropped it
as of that date. AM International emerged from the second reor-
ganization on September 29, 1993. We followed the emerged com-
pany for 6.4 years until the uniform cut-off date for our study,
which was February 20, 2000. Thus, AM International counted as
two of the 188 companies studied, as one refiling, and as a total of
15.1 years of following.
D. Calculation of the Background Rate
To determine whether a rate of refiling is "high" or "low" re-
quires some benchmark for comparison. We chose to compare the
annual filing rates for the emerged companies we studied with the
annual filing rates for all public companies (the "background rate").
27. Technically, it might be possible for two cases regarding the same debtor to be pending
at the same time. See, e.g., In re Strause, 97 B.R. 22 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989). This sometimes
occurs when creditors file a voluntary petition in one court and the debtor responds by filing a
voluntary petition in another. Such multiple refilings, if they occurred, were counted as single
refilings for purposes of this study.
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Table 1
Background Rate by Year
Year Public companies Number of public Rate of public
filing bankruptcy companies Company filing
existing
1983 89 9,047 0.98%
1984 121 10,717 1.13%
1985 149 11,121 1.34%
1986 149 12,450 1.20%
1987 112 14,620 0.77%
1988 122 16,3552s 0.75%
1989 135 18,090 0.75%
1990 115 16,123 0.71%
1991 125 13,424 0.93%
1992 91 12,114 0.75%
1993 86 12,764 0.67%
1994 70 13,019 0.54%
1995 84 12,753 0.66%
1996 84 12,977 0.65%
1997 82 13,173 0.62%
1998 122 12,442 0.98%
1999 145 11,998 1.21%
All years 1881 223,187 0.84%
To obtain the background rate for each year from 1983 to
1999, we divided the number of public companies reported by New
Generation Research, Inc. to have filed bankruptcy in that year 29 by
the number of public companies reported in existence that year by
the SEC.30 As shown in Table 1, that background rate varies signifi-
cantly from year to year. It declined from a high of 1.34% in 1985 to
28. The DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 30, 1988) erroneously contained the Introduction for
the September 30, 1987 edition. As a result, no number of public companies in existence in Sop.
tember 30, 1988 was published. The number included here is an arithmetic interpolation bo-
tween the numbers published for 1987 and 1989.
29. NEW GENERATION RESEARCH, INC., THE BANKRUPrCYYEARBOOK & ALMANAC 44 (1998).
30. The number of companies was reported for each year from 1983 through 1999, with tho
exception of 1988. E.g., DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 30, 1999) at 1 ('This report makes available
a listing of 11,998 companies required to file annual reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission according to currently available information."). In 1988, a misprint occurred. See
supra note 28.
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a low of 0.54% in 1994, and then rose to its second highest level,
1.21%, in 1999. For filings in all years the combined the rate was
0.84%.31
When we calculated refiling rates based on years since con-
firmation rather than calendar years, the refilings may have oc-
curred in different years, against different background rates. Be-
cause the number of companies followed were generally small in the
early years of our study and larger in the later years, ignoring the
years in which refilings occurred might overstate some rates and
understate others. To derive a background rate appropriate for
comparison with non-year-specific rates, we calculated an average
background rate for the entire period of the study, in which the
background rates for particular years were weighted according to
the number of companies followed in each year. That rate was
0.77% for the years 1983 through 1999. The difference between the
weighted background rate (0.77%) and the unweighted one (0.84%)
reflects the fact that a disproportionate amount of our following oc-
curred in years when the background rate was relatively low.
E. Data Sources and Collection Procedures
All of the data used in this study were gathered in accord
with BRD protocols and made part of that database. 32 The data
were gathered from a wide variety of public sources. They included
the Public Access to Court Electronic Records ('TACER") databases
maintained by the various bankruptcy courts, the Bankruptcy Da-
taSource (BKRTCY/BDS on LEXIS), the on-line records of the SEC,
and the Newsgroup files on LEXIS. We consulted other sources as
necessary.
We tracked each company from the time it emerged from
bankruptcy to the end of the following period. Many of the compa-
nies changed their names during the periods we followed them and
we adjusted our searches accordingly. For each of the companies
followed, we were able to determine either (1) a specific event that
terminated the following period33 or (2) that the company remained
in business after February 20, 2000.
31. This number is the total number of public companies filing bankruptcy (1,881) divided
by the total number of public companies existing (223,187), as shown in Table 1.
32. Before an item of information is included in the BRD, the source is photocopied or
printed in hard copy and reviewed by Lynn M. LoPucki for compliance with the protocols. The
hard copy is then included in the file for that case maintained by Lynn . LoPucki at the UCLA
Law School so that the information can.be audited by BRD users.
33. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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II. FINDINGS
The rate at which companies refiled over the entire period of
this study was 3.1% per year. That rate is more than four times the
weighted background rate of 0.77%.
A. Refiling Rate Over Time
Table 2 shows the refiling rates by year. Data for years in
which relatively few companies were followed have been combined
so that the number of company-years of following remains approxi-
mately the same for each of the periods on which we reported. For
example, the years 1983-89 were combined because of the small
numbers of companies followed in each of those years.
Table 2 shows that refiling rates were highest in two periods.
The first was from 1983 through 1991 and the second was from
1994 through 1996. The background rate of filing for all public
companies was high from 1983 through 1991, dipped to its lowest
levels in 1993 through 1997, and then rose to record high levels in
1998 to 2000. Column (6) of Table 2 shows that the refiling rate was
highest in relation to the background rate in 1994 through 1996, a
period when filings were low, but refilings were high.
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Table 2
Refiling Rates by Year34
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year(s) No. of Company- Refiling Background Refiling rate
refilings years of rate rate of filing as a 0'S of
following background
rate
1983-89 5 116.4 4.305 0.950%S 452%
1990-91 4 91.2 4.405 0.81% 540%
1992 0 72.8 0 0.7505 0%
1993 1 107.6 0.9% 0.67% 138%
1994 5 123.2 4.1% 0.5405 755%
1995 6 125.8 4.80S 0.660 7240S%
1996 5 113.5 4.4% 0.65% 681S5
1997 3 101.8 2.9% 0.62% 473%
1998 2 88.7 2.335 0.98% 230%
1999-2000 1 92.0 1.1% 1.21% 90%
TOTAL 32 1033.1 3.10% 0.84% 368%3"
B. Refiling Rates by Time Elapsed from Emergence
We initially hypothesized that the refiling rate for emerging
companies would be low in the companies' first year after confirma-
tion because the companies had just been reorganized and the court
had determined, at the time of confirmation, that confirmation was
"not likely to be followed by ... the need for further financial reor-
ganization."5 We expected that rate to increase over a period of
years as the effects of inadequacies in the reorganizations worked
themselves to the surface. Later, we expected the rate to decline to
near the background rate as subsequent events resolved the finan-
cial problems that had not been resolved in the bankruptcy, and as
the bankruptcy filing became a matter of distant history.
To test our hypothesis, we calculated the rate of refiling for
each of the first sixteen years after confirmation. (No emerging
company was available for following for a period longer than seven-
teen years.) That is, to calculate the rate of refiling for the first year
after confirmation, we determined how many of the companies fol-
lowed refiled in their first year after confirmation and we then di-
34. Figures presented are from spreadsheet calculations. Products and quotients are af-
fected by rounding.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).
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vided that number by the number of companies that potentially
could have filed: the number followed during their first year after
confirmation. We then repeated the process for each succeeding
year. The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Annual filing rate by years after confirmation
1980-1996 cases
Year after Number of Company- % of companies
confirmation companies years of fol- refiling
refiling lowing
1 3 185.3 1.6%
2 5 177.5 2.8%
3 7 159.6 4.4%
4 5 120.3 4.2%
5 4 102.8 3.9%
6 2 83.2 2.4%
7 3 64.1 4.7%
8 0 42.5 0%
9 1 30.8 3.2%
10 0 23.7 0%
11 2 17.1 11.7%
12 0 10.7 0%
13 0 7.3 0%
14 0 3.5 0%
15 0 3.0 0%
16 0 2.4 0%
17 0 1.2 0%
Total 32 10356 3.1%
Because of the relatively low numbers of filings and expo-
sures in years after the fifth, we combined the sixth and seventh
years in a single data point and all years beyond the seventh in a
single data point. The effect was to smooth the graph and bring out
what we believe to be the pattern of refiling rates. That pattern is
shown in Figure 1.
36. Differs from total years of following due to rounding.
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Figure 1.
Refiling rate by year after confirmation
5.0%
4.5%
4.01;
3- 3.5%
3 1.0%
2.5%
C
0.0%
16 2Z6% 4.4% 4,2% IM 34% 21 %1 2 3 4 1 .07 A,7
Year after Confirmation
The pattern is essentially as we hypothesized. The rate be-
gan low in the period after confirmation. The first refiling occurred
in the eighth month after confirmation. The rate steadily increased
through the third year and then steadily declined.
In two respects, however, the pattern of refilings differed
from what we hypothesized. First, refilings began earlier than we
expected. The rate of refiling in the first year after confirmation
was more than double the weighted background rate of 0.77%. Sec-
ond, the refiling rate did not recede to near the background rate
during the period of the study. For the period beyond the seventh
year, considered as a whole, the refiling rate was 2.6%, more than
three times the weighted background rate.37
C. Refiling Rates by Court
1. All Cases
Rampant forum shopping occurred during the period covered
by this study. During the 1980s, New York was the principal desti-
37. The fact that none refiled after the eleventh year is not a strong indication that the rate
declines to zero, or even to the background rate, during those years because the number of com-
panies followed is so small. If the filing rate remained at 2.1% per year after the eleventh year,
the expected number of filings during that period would be only 0.6.
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nation for that shopping.38 In 1990, companies began filing in
Delaware and by 1993 Delaware had replaced New York as the fo-
rum of choice for large bankruptcy reorganization cases.3 9 Of the
188 cases in our study, thirty-one (16%) emerged from Delaware
court reorganizations, thirty-six (19%) emerged from New York
court reorganizations, and 121 (64%) emerged from reorganizations
in all other courts combined. 40 The next most active city was Los
Angeles with twelve (6%).
Companies emerging from reorganization in Delaware or
New York were considerably more likely to refile than companies
emerging from reorganization in other courts, 41 whether the rate of
refiling is measured by the riumber of refilings or the number of
refilings per year of following. Table 4 shows that ten of the thirty-
one companies emerging from Delaware reorganizations (32%) have
refiled and ten of the thirty-six companies emerging from New York
reorganizations (28%) have refiled, while only twelve of the 121
companies emerging from reorganization in all other courts (10%)
have refiled. The difference between Delaware, on the one hand,
and New York and all other courts on the other, is greater when
measured in refilings per year followed because the Delaware cases
occurred in recent years and therefore have been followed for
shorter times. Delaware's ten refilings occurred in 116 years of fol-
lowing, a refiling rate of 8.6% per year. New York's ten refilings
occurred in 192.6 years of following, a refiling rate of 5.2% per year.
The twelve refilings from all other courts occurred in 726.4 years of
following, a refiling rate of only 1.7% per year. Thus measured,
Delaware's rate of refiling is more than five times the rate for all
other courts.
38. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 29.
39. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 979 (graph showing relative numbers of
shops to New York, Delaware, and all other districts from 1980 to 1997).
40. In this study, we have focused on courts rather than districts because the greatest dif-
ferences are between courts. For this purpose a "court' is defined as the judge or panel of judges
in a particular city. Focusing on districts shows less pronounced differences. For example,
White Plains is part of the Southern District of New York, but does not share the Manhattan
panel's high refiling rate.
41. Aside from Delaware and New York, only the Houston court produced more than one ro-
filer; it produced two.
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Table 4
Refiling Rates by Court, 1983-96
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Court Companies No. of 0 Com- Years Refilings
emerging refilings refiling pany- followed per year
years of per case followed
following
Delaware 31 10 32% 116.0 3.7 8.6%
New York 36 10 28% 192.6 5.4 5.2%
City
All other 121 12 10% 726.4 6.0 1.7%
Total 1 188 32 17% 1035.0 5.5 3.1%
Average
The difference in the proportion of companies refiling be-
tween Delaware and all other courts was significant at the 0.01
level.42 The difference in the proportion of companies refiling be-
tween New York City and all other courts was significant at the
0.05 level. The difference in the proportion of companies refiling
between Delaware and New York was not significant. The precise
results of these tests are shown in Table 4a.43
Because the Delaware court only began reorganizing signifi-
cant numbers of large public companies after 1990,44 the Delaware
companies in our study have been followed for shorter periods of
time than the companies emerging from other courts. Because the
proportion of companies refiling can increase with time, but by
definition cannot decrease, the percentage of companies refiling will
tend to be higher when companies are followed for a longer period
42. That is, the probability that so large a difference in percent refiling would occur by
chance in this size population of cases is less than one in one hundred.
43.
Table 4a
Tests of Statistical Significance
Refiling Rates by Court. 1983-96
Data Sets Compared Two-tailed p on
Fisher exact test
Delaware: 10 refiled, 22 All others: 12 refiled, 109 0.0072
did not did not
New York: 10 refiled, 26 All others: 12 refiled, 109 0.0203
did not did not
Delaware: 10 refiled, 22 New York: 10 refiled, 26 0.8932
did not did not
44. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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of time. Thus, the shorter following period for Delaware cases
causes the figures in column (4) of Table 4 to tend to understate the
rate of refiling from Delaware reorganizations as compared with
other courts' reorganizations. On the other hand, because the rate
of refiling per year of following is highest in the early years after
emergence, the figures in column (7) of Table 4 tend to overstate
the rate of refiling from Delaware reorganizations as compared with
other courts' reorganizations.
To reduce the possible distortions in our data resulting from
these opposing tendencies, we made the same calculations as in Ta-
ble 4, but included only companies that emerged from reorganiza-
tion after 1990-the period when Delaware was in full operation.
The results of these calculations are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Refiling Rates by Court, 1991-96
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Court Companies No. of % Company- Years Refilings
emerging refilings refiling years of followed per year
following per case followed
Delaware 30 9 30% 114.3 3.8 7.9%
New York 22 5 23% 104.9 4.7 4.8%
City
All other 75 4 5% 358.5 4.8 1.1%
Total/ 127 18 14% 577.7 4.5 3.1%
Average_____ ______ __ ___
Based on this more recent segment of the data, the difference
between Delaware and all other courts is greater while the differ-
ence between New York and all other courts is reduced. The percent
refiling from Delaware is six times the percent refiling from reor-
ganizations in all other courts. Calculated in refilings per year,
Delaware's 7.9% rate is more than seven times as high as the ag-
gregate rate for other courts (excluding New York).
The difference in percent refiling between Delaware and
other courts (excluding New York) as shown in column (4) of Table
5 was significant at the 0.01 level. The difference in refiling rates
between New York City and all other courts was significant only at
the 0.10 level, and the difference in refiling rates between Delaware
250 [Vol. 54:2:231
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and New York was not significant. The precise results of these tests
are shown in Table 5a.45
2. Prepackaged Cases
A "prepackaged" bankruptcy is one in which the debtor pro-
poses its plan to creditors and obtains sufficient votes in favor of it
to warrant consensual confirmation before filing a bankruptcy case
with the court. Prepackaged bankruptcies are confirmed relatively
quickly after filing, and the direct costs of these bankruptcy cases
are relatively low. 46 Some scholars have lauded prepackaged bank-
ruptcies as the product of efficient contracting,47 while others criti-
cize them as potential means of avoiding scrutiny of unfair or in-
adequate plans.48
Debtors commonly use prepackaged bankruptcies to reduce
the amounts owing to bondholders. The debtor begins by making an
exchange offer-stock and/or new bonds in smaller face amounts, in
exchange for existing bonds on which the debtor has defaulted. Ac-
cepting creditors return a ballot voting in favor of the plan. If the
vote in favor of the plan is sufficiently high (90% or 95% in favor),
the debtor may choose to restructure out of court while paying the
dissenting bondholders in full. If the vote in favor of the plan is not
that high, but is sufficiently high to win consensual confirmation of
the plan (a majority in number of the existing bondholders, holding
at least two thirds in amount of the bonds), the debtor files for
45.
Table Sa
Tests of Statistical Significance
Refiling Rates by Court 1991-96
Data Sets Compared Two-tailed p on
Fisher exact test
Delaware: 9 refiled, 21 did All others: 4 refiled, 71 did 0.0028
not not
New York: 5 refiled, 17 did All others: 4 refiled, 71 did 0.0525
not not
Delaware: 9 refiled, 21 did New York 5 refiled, 17 did 0.7953
not not
46. See Tashjian et al., supra note 18, at 144 (finding mean direct costs in prepackaged
cases of 1.85% of total assets in contrast with Weiss's finding direct costs in nonprepackaged
cases of 2.8% of total assets).
47. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 12, at 1374-76.
48. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 994-95.
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bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court then has the power to impose the
exchange on all bondholders, including the dissenters. 49
Although prepackaged bankruptcies constitute a minority of
the cases filed in Delaware, the Delaware court has attracted a
greater proportion of prepackaged cases than have other courts. In
a study of filings from 1990 to 1997, Eisenberg and LoPucki found
that 39% of Delaware cases were prepackaged while only 14% of
cases in other districts were prepackaged. 50
We found that companies emerging from prepackaged bank-
ruptcies after 1990 were more likely to refile than were companies
emerging from non-prepackaged cases during the same period. As
noted in Table 5, the refiling rate for all companies emerging dur-
ing that period was only 14% (eighteen of 127 companies). The cor-
responding rate for companies emerging from prepackaged cases
was 22% (seven of thirty-two companies). Although large, the dif-
ference was not statistically significant; so, the difference may have
occurred simply by chance.
As shown in Table 6, the percent refiling during our study
was nearly five times as high for companies emerging from Dela-
ware and New York City prepackaged bankruptcies (33%) as for
companies emerging from prepackaged cases in all other courts
(7%). When the refiling rate is measured as an annual percentage
rate for the period the companies were followed, the New York re-
filing rate (6.4% per year) remains nearly five times the rate for
other cities excluding Delaware (1.4% per year). The Delaware rate
of refiling is 9.2% per year, over six times the rate for all other cit-
ies (excluding New York). The differences in refiling rates shown on
Table 6 were not, however, statistically significant.
49. In the absence of bankruptcy, provisions of the Trust Indenture Act prevent any major-
ity of bondholders from imposing a plan reducing principal or interest or extending maturity
dates on any minority through voting. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (1994 & Supp. 2000); see, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987).
50. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 992-93 (reporting the results of an empirical
study). The difference in filing rates for prepackaged cases was significant at the 0.001 level. Id.
252 [Vol. 54:2:231
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Table 6
Refiling Rates by Court, 1983-96
Prepackaged Cases Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Court Companies No. of % Company- Years Refilings
emerging refilings refiling years of followed per year
following per case followed
Delaware 15 5 33% 54.4 3.6 9.2%
New York 3 1 33% 15.7 5.2 6.4%
City
All other 14 1 7% 73.2 5.2 1.4035
Total / 32 7 220% 143.2 4.5 4.9%
Average _______________________________
The rates reported in Table 6 are subject to the same distor-
tions discussed in the preceding Section.5' To eliminate them, we
recalculated the table, including only companies that emerged from
prepackaged reorganizations after 1990. The results are displayed
in Table 7.
51. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Table 7
Refiling Rates by Court, 1991-96
Prepackaged Cases Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Court Companies No. of % Company- Years Rofilings
emerging refilings refiling years of followed per yoar
following per case followed
Delaware 15 5 33% 54.4 3.652  9.2%
New York 3 1 33% 15.7 4.6 6.4%
City
All other 12 0 0 56.0 4.7 0.0%
Total / 30 6 20% 126.0 4.2 4.8%
Average
The statistics in Table 7 are very similar to those in Table 6
because all but two of the companies emerging from prepackaged
bankruptcy cases did so after 1990. Those two companies emerged
from courts other than Delaware or New York. One refiled; the
other did not. Table 7 shows even more clearly that companies
emerging from prepackaged bankruptcy cases in Delaware and New
York are more likely to refile than companies emerging from other
courts. The difference in refiling rates between those two courts
combined and all other courts was statistically significant at the
0.10 level.53 The difference in refiling rates between Delaware and
all other courts (excluding New York) was also significant at the
0.10 level,54 but (excluding Delaware) the difference in refiling rate
52. The Delaware cases are followed for a shorter time principally because so many of them
refiled so quickly. When the average number of years followed is calculated only for emerging
companies that did not refile, the numbers are as follows:
Table 8
Years Followed
Prepackaged cases, 1991-96
Non-refiling companies only
Delaware 4.4
New York 4.6
All other courts 4.7
53. On Fisher's exact test, the two-tailed p was 0.0625. In other words, if Delaware and
New York cases were in fact no more likely to lead to refiling than cases filed in other courts,
there is a 6.25% chance that this great a difference in numbers of refilings would occur by
chance.
54. On Fisher's exact test, the two-tailed p was 0.0744.
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between New York and all other courts was not statistically signifi-
cant.
III. IMPLICATIONS
While the data we present do not disprove the arguments for
the efficiency of Delaware reorganization, they do cast doubt on
those arguments, and, less directly, on the efficiency of Delaware
incorporation. The data we present also suggest that, for both the
Delaware and New York courts, competing for cases led to higher
refining rates.
A. Delaware Bankruptcy Reorganization
The sharply higher refiling rates for companies emerging
from Delaware bankruptcy reorganizations do not alone prove that
Delaware's refiling rates are higher than optimal. Relatively high
refiling rates are theoretically defensible. The story would go some-
thing like this. Bankruptcy reorganizations are expensive, both in
costs of administration and assets expended in the reorganization
effort. Failed bankruptcy reorganizations are even more so, because
the costs are incurred twice. The risk of confirming a plan in the
first case that might result in the necessity for a second case, how-
ever, may be more than offset by the potential for huge gains when
a company that could not propose a safe plan in the first case is
permitted to reorganize and succeeds in doing so. In reorganiza-
tions, as in business generally, risk taking is good.5
Several factors suggest that this story does not fit the pat-
tern of Delaware reorganizations. First, with 32% of the emerging
companies in bankruptcy after an average of 3.7 years of
following,56 the failure rate for Delaware reorganizations is so high
that it sharply limits the pool of cases from which the offsetting
gains would have to have been realized. Yet there do not appear to
be any dramatic successes to provide the offset.5 7 Second, as shown
in Table 9, courts grant confirmation in nearly all cases to large,
public companies, making it unlikely that the debtors' home courts
would have refused to confirm their plans on any terms. Delaware's
55. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 369-70 (Anchor Books
rev. ed. 2000) (contrasting attitudes toward failure in Silicon Valley and Germany).
56. See supra Table 4.
57. This evaluation is based only on casual examination of the list of companies that reor-
ganized successfully in Delaware.
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offsetting gains would have to be from something more subtle than
threatened refusals of confirmation at home. Third, if Delaware
were a jurisdiction that embraced risky reorganizations, it would
tend to reorganize a greater portion of its filing companies than
other districts did of theirs. Yet, as shown in Table 9, Delaware ac-
tually reorganized a slightly lower portion of its filing companies
than did other courts. 58
Table 9
Emerging companies by court
Cases filed after 1989 and disposed of before 1997
Delaware Other courts
Number of cases 38 117
Conversions 0 4
Dismissals 0 1
363 Sales 1 1
Confirmations 37 111
Emerging company 30 99
% of cases with emerging 30/38 = 79% 99/117 = 85%
companies
These data are not, however, inconsistent with a "clientele
effect"-a possible tendency on the part of debtors and their law-
yers to bring Delaware the kinds of reorganizations most likely to
fail.59 By this explanation, Delaware has the worst refiling record
because it handles the most difficult cases, cases that would have
produced even higher refiling rates at home. For such a clientele
effect to exist, however, companies or their advisors would have to
be aware of it and it almost certainly would have been noted in the
extensive debates over Delaware reorganization. It has not been.60
58. The difference was not statistically significant on Fisher's exact test.
59. Professor David Skeel has argued that venue shopping in bankruptcy cases has pro-
duced a clientele effect, but he asserted that the selection was for firms that sought to reorganize
more quickly ratherthan for firms that sought approval of high risk plans. See Skeel, supra note
1, at 27 ('Venue shopping in bankruptcy has thus produced a clientele effect, with Delaware
attracting firms that seek to reorganize quickly."). To date, we know of no one who has sug-
gested that Delaware has been attracting high risk reorganizations.
60. For example, no such claim was advanced by the Delaware State Bar Association in its
report to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission attempting to justify the forum shopping
to Delaware. See DELAWARE STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE DELAWARE STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION TO THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING
EXISTING VENUE CHOICES 19-22 (1996) (on file with author) (discussing the reasons for the forum
shopping to Delaware).
256
PUBLIC COMPANYBANKRUPTCIES
To explore the possibility that Delaware's high refiling rate
results from Delaware receiving a disproportionate share of the
most difficult cases, we determined the types of businesses most
likely to refile. 61 We found that eight of thirty-one retail trade firms
(26%) and fifteen of fifty-nine manufacturing firms (25%) emerging
from bankruptcy refiled, while only nine of ninety-three firms in
other kinds of businesses (10%) refiled. The difference was statisti-
cally significant for manufacturing firms alone at the 0.10 level,
and for manufacturing firms and retail trade firms together at the
0.01 level.62 Manufacturing and retail trade firms are more likely to
refile than firms in other businesses.
Sixteen of thirty-one firms filing in the Delaware bankruptcy
court (52%) were manufacturing or retail trade firms. Seventy-four
of 152 firms filing in other bankruptcy courts (49%) were manufac-
turing or retail trade firms. The difference is not statistically sig-
nificant.63 If Delaware receives a disproportionate share of the most
difficult cases, the pattern is not visible on a simple analysis of
business type.
We also attempted to determine whether a difference in the
sizes of the firms reorganizing in Delaware might account for Dela-
ware's higher refiling rates. The first step was to determine
whether, within the population of large companies studied, size was
related to the propensity to refile. When size was measured by
61. For this purpose, we used the categorization of firms by primary Standard Industrial
Classification Code ('SIC Code"), in Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, using
only the first level, SIC Division. For an explanation of the SIC Code system generally, see
EXECUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL 11-18 (1987). Professor IoPucki obtained the bulk of the
SIC code data from Standard and Poor's, Corporations volume (1980-97). The first code listed for
a company in that volume is the primary code. (This fact does not appear in the books, but was
confirmed with Standard and Poor's.) S & P codes were verified by comparing them with codes
listed in other publications, including the Bankruptcy DataSource and Access. If the S & P code
matched the code from another source, Professor LoPucki accepted the S & P code. If it did not,
he obtained a description of the business from the 10-K before and checked the code for plausi-
bility. All judgments were made by Lynn M. LoPucki. In a few cases no source was available for
verification and he accepted the S & P code. If the SIC Code was assigned under the 1977 SIC
system, he converted to the 1987 system using the official conversion table and a description of
the business. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Protocols for Bankruptcy Research Database (May 22,
2000).
62. On Fisher's exact test, the two-tailed p was 0.0859 for manufacturing firms, 0.2820 for
retail trade firms, and 0.0079 for manufacturing and retail trade firms combined.
63. On Fisher's exact test, the two.tailed p was 0.9198. We also tested manufacturing and
retail firms separately. Twelve of thirty-one firms emerging in Delaware (391%) were manufac-
turing firms; forty-seven of 152 firms emerging in other courts (31%) were manufacturing firms.
The difference was not statistically significant. Four of thirty-one firms emerging in Delaware
(13%) were retail trade; twenty-seven of 152 firms emerging in other courts (18%) were retail
trade. The difference was not statistically significant.
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mean sales or numbers of employees, or by median sales or num-
bers of employees, or by book value of assets, we found no statisti-
cally significant relationship between size of the initially filing
company and refiling.64 When size was measured by the book value
of assets prior to the initial filing, the difference in means between
the refiling companies ($837 million) and nonrefiling companies
($1,626 million) was significant at the 0.05 level.65 The reorganiza-
tion of smaller companies appeared more likely to lead to refiling
than the reorganizations of larger companies.
When only cases filed after 1990-the period of Delaware's
operation-were considered, however, the difference in means for
refiling companies ($1,021 million) and nonrefiling companies
($1,269 million) was smaller and not statistically significant. 66
When the New York cases were removed from that population, the
relationship between size and propensity to file reversed. The mean
size of the refiling companies ($889 million) was greater than the
mean size of the nonrefiling companies ($746 million). 67 Thus, for
the period after 1990, it is no longer clear that the reorganization of
smaller companies was more likely to lead to refiling than the reor-
ganization of larger companies.
Even if it were true that smaller companies were more likely
to refile than larger ones, that could not explain why Delaware had
higher refiling rates. After 1990, the mean size of the Delaware
cases ($889 million) was slightly larger than the mean size of cases
64. When measured by sales or numbers of employees, larger companies were slightly more
likely to refile than smaller companies. But when measured by book value of assets, smaller
companies were slightly more likely to refile than larger companies.
Table 10
Refilings by firms Refiling by firms
larger than the smaller than the
median size median size
Sales 17 (57%) 13 (43%)
Assets 14 (45%) 17 (55%)
Employees 19 (59%) 13 (41%)
65. The means were $1,626 million for 150 nonrefiling companies and $837 million for
thirty-one refiling companies. The standard deviations for the nonrefiing companies was $4,481
million while the standard deviation for refiling companies was $822 million. The difference was
significant at the 0.047 level on a t-test for equality of means with equal variances not assumed,
66. C(T0.813, p=0.42). During this period, the number of refiling companies was eighteen
and the number of nonrefiling companies was 104.
67. Removal of the New York cases is appropriate because the purpose of the comparison in
means is to explain the difference in filing rates between Delaware and courts other than Dela-
ware and New York. Excluding the New York cases, there were thirteen refilers and eighty-
three nonrefilers.
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in courts other than Delaware and New York ($745 million). Thus,
with respect to both type of business and size, the companies filing
in Delaware appear to be no different than those filing in other
courts.
68
The fourth reason for believing that Delaware's refiling rate
is higher than optimal is that, during the period covered by the
study, the Delaware court did not appear to be making informed
decisions on which risks to undertake. 69 Rather, the court was sim-
ply confirming whatever the parties presented. At least in retro-
spect, it appears that, if the court had taken a more active ap-
proach, it would not have confirmed some of the plans that ulti-
mately failed. For example, Memorex Telex, N.V. solicited and won
acceptance of a prepackaged plan of reorganization in December,
1991,70 on the basis of projections showing that the company would
return to profitability in its next fiscal year.7 1 On January 6, 1992,
the company filed its prepackaged bankruptcy in Delaware. The
court confirmed the plan a month later, on February 7, 1992-a re-
68. Another possible clientele would be subordinated bondholders, who might bring cases to
Delaware because they prefer higher risk reorganizations. Although we do not have the data to
respond directly to that theory, we do have data that suggest it is not the explanation for Dela-
ware's higher filing rates. First, subordinated bondholders are most prominent in prepackaged
cases. If subordinated bondholders brought cases to Delaware to take higher risks, then Dela.
ware prepackaged cases should fail more often than Delaware nonprepackaged cases. They do
not. See infra, note 108. Second, the high refiling rates that accompanied New York's domi-
nance of bankruptcy reorganization in the 1980s did not involve such a clientele effect. The data
gathered by LoPucki and Whitford indicate that while seven of the thirteen large public reor-
ganizations that proceeded in New York in the early to mid-1980s had subdebt, in all seven of
those cases the debtor needed the agreement of substantial senior or general classes of impaired
creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Data Sheets (on file with Lynn M. Lo-
Pucki).
69. One might argue that Delaware reorganization is efficient because the court permits
managers to act without constraint from the court or creditors. At the time of bankruptcy, how-
ever, the incentives of managers are sufficiently different from those of their companies to render
such an argument implausible. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Govern-
ance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L REV.
669, 710-16 (1993) (discussing employment contract incentives and employment market incen-
tives). Absent controls, managers would pursue their own interest. Bebchuk has shown that
market incentives do not work well even as means of controlling incorporation decisions. See
Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1461-70.
70. See Memorex Telex N. V. Announces Support for Restructuring Plan, BUS. VIRE, Nov. 27,
1991 ( Memorex Telex announced Wednesday it has obtained broad based support and will
commence solicitation for acceptances for its previously announced prepackaged reorganization
plan."); Kathie O'Donnell, New Debt Offerings Approach $2 Billion But Fear of Higher Rates Isn't
the Reason, BOND BUYER, Feb. 20, 1992, at 3 (commenting that the b" rating assigned to Memo-
regs senior guaranteed notes "reflects Memorex's still onerous debt burden....").
71. See MEMOREX TELEX, N.V. AND MEMOREX TELEX CORPORATION, PROX"y STATF2,mENr-
PROSPECTUS AND SOLICITATION OF ACCEPTANCES FOR A JOINT PREPACKAGED PLAN OF
REORGANIZATION, Nov. 27, 1991, at 65 (showing projected "Net income (loss)" for the "Post-
Restructuring Year Ending Mar. 31, 1993" of $15.5 million).
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cord short time for the bankruptcy reorganization of a large, public
company. Memorex shed $550 million in debt through confirmation
of the plan, but that amount only slightly more than offset Memo-
rex's $429 million operating loss for the year prior to confirmation 72
Memorex was regarded as a "highly leveraged company" even as it
emerged from the first bankruptcy.73 Instead of the $15 million in
profits projected just before the year began, Memorex posted a loss
of $382 million for the year ended March 31, 1993. 74
In June of 1992, just four months after confirmation, Memo-
rex acknowledged the failure of its March reorganization by re-
opening negotiations with its creditors. 75 The bargain eventually
struck in those renegotiations was the basis for a second Delaware
bankruptcy filing that was concluded in March, 1994.76 In this sec-
ond reorganization, the company did what it should have done in
the first-slashed its debt from $700 million to $100 million. 77 But
by then it was too late. The second reorganization was followed by a
third filed in October, 1996. During that third Memorex bank-
ruptcy, the company ceased doing business and was liquidated,
with pieces going to several different buyers.
Memorex had entered the Delaware reorganization process
in January 1992 with about $1.5 billion in assets. 78 In the ensuing
four years-through its three Delaware bankruptcies-the company
posted losses totaling $1.23 billion for continuing operations, 79
leaving insufficient funds in the end even to pay the priority claims
of employees. 80
72. See MEMOREX TELEX, N.V. FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED MAR. 31, 1992, at 12
(showing losses of $429 million for the year ended Mar. 31, 1992).
73. Mernorex Telex Impresses Analysts, 2 JUNK BOND REP., Mar. 23, 1992, at 1 ("Despite the
restructuring, Memorex Telex is still regarded as a highly leveraged company.").
74. See MEMOREX TELEX, N.V. FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED MAR. 31, 1996, at 8.
75. See Jim Barnett, Memorex Money Woes Grow Computer Company Is Negotiating Again,
NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 2, 1993, at C9 ("A year and a half after getting out of
bankruptcy court, Memorex Telex N.V. again is negotiating with creditors to make ends meet."),
76. See, e.g., David Mok, Memorex Teler Out of the Woods, Finally?, BUS. TIMES (Singapore)
Aug. 22, 1994, at 13 (stating that the company came out of chapter 11 reorganization in March).
77. See Memorex Corporate Milestones, COMPUTER BUS. REV., Nov. 1, 1996. Cutting the
debt earlier may not have assured success, but not cutting it may have assured failure.
78. See MEMOREX TELEX, N.V. FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED MAR. 31, 1996, at 12
(showing total assets of $1.452 billion at the end of fiscal year 1992).
79. See id. at 11, 33 (showing "loss[es] before income taxes," before crediting the "extraordi-
nary items" in 1992 and 1994 resulting from discharge of indebtedness in the company's bank-
ruptcies, of $382.6 million in 1993, $491.8 million in 1994, $103.9 million in 1995, and $246.7
million in 1996, for a total of $1.23 billion).
80. See Dan Rutherford, Flood of Changes Drowned Memorex Telex, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 10,
1996, at El (quoting a corporate officer's statements that the $40 million from the sale of Memo-
rex Telex's operations "will likely be used to pay off the debtor-in-possession financing" and ex-
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The unrealistic projections that enabled Memorex to win ap-
proval of its first reorganization-later referred to as a "joke" by
one securities analyst 8 -- also accomplished something else. They
enabled Giorgio Ronchi, who had been chief executive officer of
Memorex since its founding in 1986, to become one of the few CEOs
of a major public company to remain in office throughout the com-
pany's failure and bankruptcy reorganization.8 2
In another Delaware case, Cherokee, Inc. projected that its
operating income for the year after bankruptcy would be more than
five times what it was for the year prior to bankruptcy.8 On the
basis of that projection, the bondholders voted in favor of the plan.84
Three days after Cherokee filed the bankruptcy case, a leading
analyst was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that, "[i]f
the company stabilizes at the current level or worsens, this reor-
ganization could be just a band-aid."85 Nevertheless, the Delaware
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan on June 1, 1993, just thirty-
two days after the case was filed.
As a result of the overly optimistic projections, Cherokee
emerged with more debt than it could pay.8G Three months after
confirmation, Cherokee revised its income statement for the quarter
pressing doubt "there's going to be enough money left over to satisfy unsecured creditors...
namely employees who may have claims against the company").
81. See Cecile Gutscher, Future Uncertain for Prepackaged Memorex Telex Plan, HIGH
YIELD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1994, at 6 (quoting an unnamed analyst as saying, "[the revenue projec-
tions] were a joke. They missed by a humongous amount by a factor of four.).
82. Ronchi was replaced in November of 1992, while the company was negotiating with
creditors for its second reorganization. In their study of similar reorganizations in the 1980s,
LoPucki and Whitford found that 95% of the CEOs in office when the companies' financial prob-
lems first became public had been replaced by confirmation of the plan of reorganization. See
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 69, at 729. Of the two CEOs that remained in office in that
earlier study, one was in the single Delaware case included in the study. The other was in a New
York case.
83. See CHEROKEE INC., THE CHEROKEE GROUP, SOLICITATIONS OF CONSENTS AND
PREPACKAGED PLAN ACCEPTANCES DATED M IAR. 24, 1993, at 47 (Forecast Consolidated Income
Statements showing projected operating income for the fiscal years ending May 1993 and May
1994 to be $2,644,000 and $14,555,000 respectively).
84. Id.
85. Cherokee, Unit Seek Chapter 11 Protection in Bankruptcy Court, WALL ST. J.. Apr. 26,
1993, at C8 (quoting Paul Davner, an analyst with B.D.S. Securities Corp. in New York).
86. See Deborah Adamson, Cherokee Plans to File Chapter 11 Clothing Maker Struggling
With Debt From 1989 Buyout, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 1994, at B1 (quoting securities analyst
Davner as saying that, "[i]n large part, [the second bankruptcy] stems from the fact that they
came out of the last bankruptcy with too much debt" and It]he first bankruptcy problem did not
correct the leverage problem .. ").
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nearly completed before confirmation to show a $2.4 million loss
instead of the $0.5 million loss initially reported. 87
In Cherokee, as in Memorex, the prepackaged filing in Dela-
ware enabled a tainted88 CEO to accomplish the rare feat of re-
maining in office through reorganization.8 9 But it accomplished lit-
tle else. On September 16, 1994-less than sixteen months after
confirmation of its plan-Cherokee announced that it would refile
for bankruptcy. 90 The company did so on November 7, 1994, seven-
teen months after confirmation in the first case. Analysts attrib-
uted the second filing to Cherokee's failure to discharge sufficient
debt in the first.9'
TWA provides a third example of the texture of Delaware's
failures. TWA filed a non-prepackaged bankruptcy in Delaware, in
January of 1992, and emerged nineteen months later, in August of
1993. As the case approached confirmation, analysts said that
TWA's financial projections were overly optimistic, 92 and that TWA
was attempting to emerge with too high a ratio of debt to equity93
and too little cash.94 Experts were, however, doubtful that the
Delaware bankruptcy court would refuse to confirm, 95 and the ex-
perts were right.9 6
87. See Operating Loss Deepens in Quarter at Cherokee, DAILY NEWS REC., Aug. 31, 1993, at
10.
88. LoPucki and Whitford originated use of the word "tainted" to refer to a CEO who was in
office during the period the company developed the financial problems that eventually resulted
in bankruptcy. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 69, at 729.
89. Five months after confirmation, that CEO resigned. See Cherokee's Chairman, CEO
Margolis, Resigns After Reorganization, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1993, at B8.
90. See, e.g., Adamson, supra note 86.
91. See, e.g., id. (quoting analyst Paul Davner as saying "[i]n large part, [the second bank-
ruptcy] stems from the fact that they came out of the last bankruptcy with too much debt").
92. See, e.g., Adam Bryant, T. W.A.'s Bumpy Flight Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at C7
(noting that "many analysts doubt that T.W.A. will survive another year... [and they] consider
T.W.A.'s projections through 1997, which assume a 5 percent annual growth rate, optimistic').
93. See, e.g., Robert L. Rose, New TWA Chairman Hopes To Match Piedmont Success, WALL
ST. J. EUROPE, July 15, 1993, at 7 (noting analyses criticism of TWA's plan to emerge with $1
billion in long term debt and just $81 million in equity).
94. See, e.g., Bloomberg Business News, Will Beleaguered TWA's Financing Plans Fly?, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at D1 (criticizing TWA's plan to emerge with only $200 million in cash).
95. See, e.g., id. ("Most of those close to the case say it is highly unlikely that [the Delaware
bankruptcy judge] would turn down TWA's plan if it appears at all reasonable. Analysts, how-
ever, have questioned TWA's viability if it does not raise significant amounts of cash to carry it
forward after bankruptcy.").
96. See Adam Bryant, T. W.A. Gets Court Approval To End Time in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1993, at D1 (noting that "[the analysts consider the financial projections T.W.A. has
made to be overly optimistic" but "[n]evertheless [the Delaware bankruptcy judge] said T.W.A.'s
projections were realistic and conservative").
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In November, 1993, just a few months after confirmation of
its plan-and just days after the plan's effective date-TWA made
two announcements. First, it revealed lower-than-expected earnings
for the first nine months of 1993.97 Second, it had not yet assembled
the $200 million in cash that it had acknowledged before confirma-
tion was the minimum necessary to get it through the winter.98 In
January, 1994, William Howard, the CEO installed at the end of
the bankruptcy case in July, 1993, 9 unexpectedly resigned after six
months in office. 100 In the year after TWA emerged from its Dela-
ware reorganization, it suffered an additional $500 million in oper-
ating losses-about 20% of its total assets.' 0'
Howard's successor, Jeffrey Erickson, was named CEO at the
end of March, 1994. Over the next few months, TWA took "a num-
ber of steps to reverse the course it set for itself when coming out of
Chapter 11."102 In August, 1994, just twelve months after the Dela-
ware bankruptcy judge approved its plan, TWA announced that the
plan had been " 'overoptimistic' or 'unattainable' " and that TWA
had engaged Salomon Brothers "to assist in developing a financial
restructuring plan that will be presented to the current holders of
the company's debt."0 3 On December 21, 1994, TWA unveiled a new
plan of restructuring that would cut its debt load in half.104 TWA
refiled in the St. Louis bankruptcy court in June, 1995.
97. See Anthony L Velocci, Jr., Losses Shake Faith in TWA, AVIATION WIK. & SPACE TECH.,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 26 ("Trans World Airlines, Inc., last week reported a worse.than.expected $159-
million operating loss for the first nine months of 1993, eroding confidence in the carriers viabil-
ity among industry observers.").
98. See id. ("To help carry it through the winter, TWA had hoped to have available close to
$200 million in cash when it emerged from bankruptcy, but a TWA official said the total turns
out to be substantially less.").
99. See Rhonda Richards, Howard Takes the Helm at TWA, USA TODAY, Jul. 14, 1993, at
2B ("Howard takes the job just as TWA is expected to emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy-court
protection.").
100. See Harry Berkowitz, In the TWA Cockpit, There's a New Pilot, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1994,
at 27 ("In an unexpected shakeup, Trans World Airlines said late yesterday that its chairman
and a vice chairman quit....").
101. See TWA's Net Loss Grows, Operating Loss Shrinks, AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 17, 1994, at
273 (reporting net losses of $355.9 million for the last six months of 1993 and $182.6 million for
the first six months of 1994) [hereinafter TWA's Net Loss Grows]; James F. Peltz, TWA Plans
2nd Filing for Bankruptcy; Profitability: Carrier Proposes that Creditors and Note Holders For-
give $500 Million in Debt in Exchange for Stock, LA. TIMES, Jun. 28, 1995, at D2 ('A never
regained solid footing after it emerged from Chapter 11 in November, 1993, and in 1994 it lost
$433.8 million on revenue of $3.4 billion.').
102. TWA's Net Loss Grows, supra note 101, at 273.
103. TWA Announces Increases in Second-quarter Revenues and Passenger Volume; Operat-
ing Losses Slashed 44%, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 15, 1994.
104. See Christopher Carey, TWA Unteils Plan to Halve Its Debt; Improved Terms Offered to
Creditor Groups, ST. LOuiS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 1994, at 1C.
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These are not stories of calculated risk-taking by the Dela-
ware bankruptcy court. With only a month between filing and con-
firmation, the Memorex and Cherokee reorganizations occurred too
quickly for there to have been any reasoned consideration of the
risks involved. In all three cases, confirmation was followed almost
immediately by announcements of adverse information regarding
the financial performance of the companies-information that, in a
better process, might have been ferreted out before confirmation. In
all three cases, the failure of the reorganization was evident so soon
after confirmation that it suggests a mistake rather than a gamble.
In Memorex and Cherokee, CEOs-who were in a position to
know of the adverse information and who controlled the speed of
the reorganization-benefited from unusually speedy reorganiza-
tions that precluded consideration of the adverse information. The
Memorex and Cherokee stories illustrate the weakness of prepack-
aged reorganizations generally and Delaware prepackaged reor-
ganizations in particular: the court abdicates its statutory obliga-
tion to determine whether the proposed reorganization is feasible.
Of course, it is easy to criticize any confirmation that ulti-
mately results in a refiling, but we think it would be hard to match
these stories with equivalents from bankruptcy courts other than
those of Delaware and New York.10 5 Nothing in these Delaware re-
organization cases suggests that the Delaware court had any spe-
cial expertise in reorganizing large, public companies. Much sug-
gests that a part of Delaware's appeal was its willingness to con-
firm no-questions-asked reorganizations. The extraordinary high
failure rate that resulted from these reorganizations suggests a
lack of "efficiency" in the Delaware process at that time-the very
time in which the Delaware court was establishing its dominance of
the market for large, public company reorganizations.
Professor Stuart Gilson's comparison of refiling rates for out-
of-court restructuring with those for bankruptcy reorganizations
may shed additional light on the reasons for Delaware's poor per-
formance. Gilson found that, "once firms encounter financial dis-
tress and become highly leveraged, they typically stay highly lever-
105. Probably the most notorious failure in bankruptcy reorganization was Eastern Airlines.
See, e.g., James J. White, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467, 469-70 (1995) CA leader of
the parade of horribles is Eastern Airlines. When Eastern Airlines filed its petition, it was
thought that the unsecured creditors would receive payment in full had it liquidated at once.
When the company liquidated twenty-two months later, the unsecured creditors received a pit-
tance."). Consistent with our thesis, that case proceeded in the New York City bankruptcy court
under Judge Burton Lifland. See LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 6.
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aged even after they negotiate new payment terms with their credi-
tors. Leverage ratios are most sticky when debt is restructured out
of court; they are least sticky when debt is restructured in Chapter
11."106 The result, Gilson found, was that firms restructuring out of
court refailed at more than twice the rate of firms that reorganized
under Chapter 11 did.10 7 Extrapolating from Gilson's findings, it
appears that the Delaware bankruptcy court's laissez-faire ap-
proach to confirmation may not provide sufficient encouragement
for firms to reduce their leverage ratios.
Defenders of Delaware may attempt to excuse Delaware's
high refiling rates with the observation that Delaware has a higher
proportion of prepackaged cases and that prepackaged cases, being
similar to out-of-court reorganizations, are inherently more likely to
fail. That excuse, however, is in conflict with the data. Delaware's
failure rate for nonprepackaged cases is substantially the same as
its failure rate on prepackaged cases, 08 and all other (excluding
New York) courts' failure rate for nonprepackaged cases is substan-
tially the same as their failure rate for prepackaged cases. 09 It thus
appears that prepacks are not giving Delaware a bad name, but
Delaware is giving prepacks a bad name.
B. New York Bankruptcy Reorganization
New York has never shared the cachet that Delaware enjoys
among economically-oriented legal scholars. When a study by Lo-
Pucki and Whitford revealed the prominence of the New York bank-
ruptcy court in large, public company reorganizations in the 1980s,
no legal scholar stepped forward to proclaim the New York court's
efficiency. The lawyers LoPucki and Whitford interviewed painted a
mixed picture. Among the attractions to New York, they listed con-
venience of the courthouse for debtors' executives (many of whom
106. Gilson, supra note 16, at 168.
107. Id. at 167-68.
108. Five of fifteen Delaware prepackaged cases (33%) led to refiings, sce supra Table 6,
while five of sixteen Delaware nonprepackaged cases (31%) led to refilings. See supra Table 4.
Of the nine firms emerging from Delaware reorganizations in 1997-the year after the period
covered by our study-two of the seven that filed nonprepackaged cases refiled, while neither of
the two that filed prepackaged cases refiled. If this data is added to the data from our study,
Delaware's rate of refiling from nonprepackaged cases (303S) is actually higher than its rate of
refiling from prepackaged cases (29%).
109. One of fourteen other court prepackaged cases (7%) led to a refiling, see supra Table 6,
while eleven of 107 other court nonprepackaged cases (10%) led to refilings. See supra Table 4.
During the period 1991-96, all four of the refilings in other court cases were in nonprepackaged
cases.
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had offices in New York), the location of the leading bankruptcy
professionals there, the expertise of the New York bankruptcy court
in large, public company bankruptcies, the inclination of that bank-
ruptcy court to grant delays to debtors, and the court's willingness
to approve relatively high attorneys' fees. 0
As previously noted, the refiling rate for companies emerging
from New York reorganizations during the period of this study was
only slightly lower than the rate for those emerging from Delaware
reorganizations."' Three aspects of the pattern of inter-court com-
petition and refiling rates suggest that the competition itself caused
the higher refiling rates.
First, New York generated high refiling rates during its pe-
riod of dominance-the 1980s. During that decade, companies
emerging in New York had a greater tendency to refile than compa-
nies emerging from other courts. Five of thirteen companies
emerging in New York during the 1980s (38%) refiled during the
period of this study; only eight of thirty-three emerging from other
courts during that period (24%) refiled.1 2 This higher proportion of
refilers mirrors Delaware's higher proportion during Delaware's
period of dominance.
Second, New York's refiling rate declined as Delaware came
to dominance. That is, the refiling rate for companies emerging in
New York during the 1990s is lower than the refiling rate for com-
panies emerging in New York during the 1980s." 3 Five of thirteen
companies that emerged from New York reorganizations during the
1980s (38%) refiled during the period of this study; only five of
twenty-three that emerged from New York reorganizations during
the 1990s (22%) refied during the period of this study." 4 This drop
in refiling rates is consistent with the hypothesis that the Delaware
court attracted cases by exhibiting a willingness to confirm shaky
plans while the New York court failed to respond in kind.
Third, the rise of New York as a center for big case bank-
ruptcy reorganization was largely the accomplishment of a single
bankruptcy judge, Burton R. Lifland." 5 Seven of the thirteen com-
panies emerging from New York reorganizations during the period
110. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 29-31.
111. See supra Tables 4 and 5.
112. The difference in refiling rates was not significant on Fisher's exact test.
113. No allowance has been made for the fact that the companies emerging in the 1980s have
been followed for a longer period than those emerging in the 1990s, so the figures given overstato
the difference in filing rates.
114. The difference in refiling rates was not significant on Fisher's exact test.
115. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 983-84.
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of LoPucki and Whitford's study (54%) emerged under confirmation
orders signed by Judge Lifland. 116 Consistent with the hypothesis
that the courts have attracted cases by exhibiting a willingness to
confirm shaky plans, Judge Lifland's cases exhibit a refiling rate
double that of his colleagues on the New York bankruptcy court.
Five of twelve companies emerging from Lifland reorganizations
(42%) refiled while only five of twenty-four emerging from other
New York judges' reorganizations (21%) refiled.11 7 Considering only
the period of New York's dominance, the difference in filing rates
between Lifland and the other New York judges is even greater.
Four of seven Lifland cases emerging during the 1980s (57%) re-
filed, while only one of five cases emerging from other New York
judges during that period (20%) refiled. 18
The New York data are consistent with the hypothesis that,
during the period of this study, courts attracted cases by exhibiting
a willingness to confirm high-risk plans. Judge Lifland apparently
did so in the 1980s, and the Delaware judges (principally Judge
Helen Balick during the period of this study) did so in the 1990s.
C. Delaware Incorporation
1. The False Issue of Federalism
Since its inception, the debate over Delaware incorporation
has been framed as one over "federalism."11 9 By "federalism," the
debaters meant the desirability of having a single, federal law gov-
erning incorporation nationwide instead of a competition among
states, each free to make its own law on the subject. 120 Implicit in
116. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at n.66.
117. The difference in refiling rates was not significant on Fisher's exact test.
118. The difference in refiling rates was not significant on Fisher's exact test.
119. See Bebchuk, supra note 3 (article titled, "Federalism and the Corporation: The Desir-
able Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law"); Cary, supra note 2 (article titled, "Feder-
alism and Corporate Law Reflections Upon Delaware"); Romano, supra note 4, at 230-31 (pre-
senting the choice as one between state and federal chartering).
120. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1457 ("To start with, a regime of state corporate law
is characterized by competitive pressure to produce the legal rules most attractive to those
making incorporation decisions. By contrast, federal law officials are not subject to the discipline
of such competitive pressure."); Cary, supra note 2, at 663 (advocating "reconsider[ation of] the
federal role"); Romano, supra note 4 at 225 (characterizing the debate as between scholars who
"believe the current federal system of regulation is preferable" and those who "call for preemp-
tive national laws"). David Skeel was the first to link bankruptcy to the federalism debate in
corporate law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corpo-
rate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994).
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the framing of this debate has been the assumption that federal law
is capable of imposing uniformity.' 2' With respect to bankruptcy
reorganization, that assumption seems not to have held. Despite
the existence of a federal law implemented by federal courts, local
interests have engaged in a competition for the bankruptcy reor-
ganization business as lively and textured as the competition for
corporate charters. Two implications are evident. First, law does
not matter as much as legal scholars think it does. 122 Second,
"states" are not the only local interests that compete for legal busi-
ness; the same kind of competition is evident in other areas of the
legal economy. 123 Competition among legal regimes is a subject in
need of broader investigation.
2. The Plausibility of Market Failure from Lack of Information
Prior to this study, the evidence supporting the efficiency of
Delaware reorganization was of much the same nature as the evi-
dence supporting the efficiency of Delaware incorporation. Put an-
other way, Delaware reorganization was thought to be efficient be-
cause the "market" chose it-debtors and their creditors, acting in
121. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 4, at 231 ("Moreover, even under national chartering there
will still be some competition: firms can exit from national jurisdiction by operating in unincor-
porated form or by migrating to another country."). Implicit in Romano's statement is the as-
sumption that, if a federal chartering law were passed, states could no longer compete for the
corporate charter business. By analogy, one should then also assume that, with a federal bank-
ruptcy law and federal bankruptcy courts, Delaware could no longer compete for bankruptcy
reorganization cases-an obvious fallacy. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 972 (argu-
ing that the bankruptcy competition is by judges, not law).
122. Skeel seeks to maximize the significance of law by emphasizing the role of discretion
and state law in bankruptcy cases. See Skeel, supra note 1, at 26 ("[Ihe bankruptcy laws leave
sufficient flexibility for the judges to develop a Delaware-specific approach ...."); Skeel, supra
note 13 (arguing that bankruptcy courts apply state law to determine the fiduciary duties of
managers). But the fact that huge differences in outcomes would exist even after the "federaliza.
tion" of an area of law bolsters, rather than refutes, our argument. For a response to Skeel, see
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 972 n.18.
123. For example, non-uniformity among the federal circuits drove Congress to create a Fed-
eral Circuit to hear patent appeals. See, e.g., Emmette F. Hale, The "Arising Under" Jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit. An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229,
239 (1986) (explaining Congress's decision to take federal patent jurisdiction from the various
federal circuits and combine them in a single court in Washington because "Congress determined
that by removing the incentive to shop for a hospitable forum, litigation costs would decrease
.... Attorneys would be in a better position to predict the outcome of litigation and, therefore,
business planning would be facilitated"). Particular federal courts.-or judges-have attracted
particular kinds of cases. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris, N.Y's Judge-shopping Channel, NAT. L.J.,
July 26, 1999, at 4 (asserting that tobacco and gun plaintiffs are flocking to the Eastern District
of New York to seek related-to assignments to Judge Jack B. Weinstein).
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concert-brought the cases to Delaware. 124 Delaware incorporation
was also thought to be efficient because the market chose it-inves-
tors were willing to pay more for a company because it was incorpo-
rated in Delaware. In both cases, the evidence for efficiency was
secondary. That is, it was not evidence showing that Delaware per-
formed better than other jurisdictions;1 25 rather, it was evidence
showing that market participants sincerely believed that it did.
If it can be shown that the market simply misassessed the
efficiency of Delaware reorganization because it lacked information,
then it would also seem possible that it misassessed the efficiency
of Delaware incorporation. What that would mean, in both cases, is
that the market is not capable of assessing the efficiency of a legal
regime. The immediate cause of this incapacity would have to be
that investors systematically overestimate the efficiency of the re-
gime selected by management. Assuming that managers are not
themselves mystified, that would in turn mean that investors were
underestimating the agency problem1 26 with respect to managers.
There is some reason to believe that the agency problem is
greater at the time of bankruptcy than at the time of
incorporation.12 7 As LoPucki and Whitford described in greater de-
tail, the constraints that impel managers to serve the interests of
investors are reduced considerably on the approach to
bankruptcy. 128 For that reason, we conclude that our evidence
merely suggests, but does not prove, a market failure with regard to
Delaware incorporation.129
124. This characterization is more true of prepackaged cases than nonprepackaged cases.
But even in nonprepackaged cases, creditors ofton have influence over the debtor's choice of a
place of filing.
125. In both bankruptcy and incorporation, Delaware has gained a reputation for "customere
service. This does not, however, answer the question of whether the race is to the top or the
bottom because in both cases the service is provided to corporate agents. Those claiming the race
is to the top argue that the agents serve shareholders. Those claiming the race is to the bottom
argue that the agents serve their own, different interests.
126. "Agency problem" is a term of art used in the finance literature to refer to the problem
investors have in assuring that managers will act in the shareholders' interests rather than in
the managers' own interests.
127. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 12, at 50-51.
128. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 69, at 694-716.
129. Several of the factors cited as responsible for Delaware "getting it right7 with regard to
incorporation are also present with regard to reorganization. Delaware state judges are under
pressure from the bar because they must be reappointed at ten-year intervals. Bankruptcy
judges are under roughly the same pressure because they must be re.appointed at fourteen-year
intervals. The state's income from franchise fees and taxes is at stake when Delaware competes
for incorporations, but so is a burgeoning community of bankruptcy professionals when Delaware
competes for reorganizations. But in both competitions, getting it right is attracting corporations,
not maximizing welfare. Bebchuk has argued that even at the time of incorporation, the conflict
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CONCLUSION
Companies that have filed for bankruptcy reorganization be-
fore are more likely to file again. The rate of refiling climbs to its
highest level in the third year after confirmation, when it reaches
about six times the background rate of filing for all public compa-
nies. The refiling rate remains elevated for at least eleven years
after confirmation. Because of the small number of companies that
could be studied for periods in excess of eleven years, we were un-
able to determine when-or whether-the refiling rate ultimately
declines to the background rate.
Refiling rates for companies reorganized in the Delaware
bankruptcy court, and to a lesser extent, the New York bankruptcy
court, were much higher than the refiling rates for companies reor-
ganized in other bankruptcy courts. We conclude, based on four sets
of findings, that these higher refiing rates were a product of inter-
court competition. First, Delaware produced high rates of refiling
during its period of competitive success in the 1990s. Second, New
York produced high rates of refiling during its period of competitive
success in the 1980s. Third, the New York refiling rates declined
after New York's period of competitive success. Fourth, the judge
that made New York competitive in the 1980s had higher refiling
rates than his colleagues on the New York court. 130
Elevated refiling rates do not, in and of themselves, indicate
a malfunctioning of the reorganization process. Efficient reorgani-
zations may, and probably would, produce companies that have a
higher probability of refiling than do public companies generally.
But the percentage of refilings in Delaware, the magnitude of the
difference between the rate of refiling in Delaware and other dis-
tricts, and the nature of Delaware's ten failures suggest that the
rate in Delaware during the period of this study was probably well
above the efficient rate.
During the period covered by this study, Delaware estab-
lished itself as the bankruptcy reorganization capital of the United
States and positioned itself to become the bankruptcy reorganiza-
between creditors and shareholders is great enough to cause a market failure because small
creditors and tort creditors cannot protect themselves. See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1489-90.
130. The fact that New York lawyers made many of the Delaware filings during the period of
the study may provide an alternative explanation. For example, seven of the ten Delaware cases
that resulted in refilings during the period of this study were initially filed by New York lawyers.
LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 6. In five of the seven cases, the New York
lawyers were lead counsel; in the other two, they were co-leads. All ten debtors also had local
counsel in Delaware, as required by local rules. See id.
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tion capital of the world. The results of this study suggest that
competition may have been economically wasteful as well as politi-
cally embarrassing.
Experience tells us that once such a legal monopoly is estab-
lished, it.has tremendous inertia and thus can be exploited by the
monopolist without risking its destruction.13' In addition, the mo-
nopolist may be able to retain its monopoly even after abandoning
the practices necessary to create it. Thus, we would not be sur-
prised if Delaware, having captured the reorganization business by
inefficient practices, were now to retain it by abandoning the most
egregious of them. If Delaware can accomplish that, its success
would mean that jurisdictions can succeed in competitions by op-
portunistically offering inefficient, yet superficially appealing, al-
ternatives and then adjusting as critics bring the inefficiencies to
light-a classic race to the bottom.
This Article has focused on a single, deleterious effect of
competition among courts for cases-high refiling rates. Some may
use our study to argue for venue amendments designed to end the
competition. But competitions among bankruptcy courts have bene-
ficial effects as well. They include the development of more effective
procedures and techniques for reorganization and liquidation, 132 the
ability of parties to route around ineffective courts and judges,'3
and better representation of the United States in the developing
global competition for cases.13 4 The best solution would be one that
distinguishes the kinds of shopping producing positive results from
those producing negative results and permits only the former to
continue. Such an ideal solution, however, would require better,
faster, and more extensive flows of information than are presently
available in the bankruptcy court system.
To expand access to information about both the venue
choices that bankruptcy fiers make and the reasons for those
131. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3 (arguing that market forces do not eliminate states' in-
centive to favor managers rather than shareholders); accord Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note
12, at 41 (noting that risk aversion will lead attorneys to shy away from untested courts).
132. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 58 (CThe primary benefit to be realized from
the continuation of forum shopping is competition among districts leading to the development of
more effective procedures and techniques for reorganization and liquidation.").
133. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 7, at 1003 (To the extent that forum shopping re-
sponds to problems with home fora, reducing the level of shopping may exacerbate those prob-
lems").
134. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 6, at 58 ("Our view is influenced by the fact that fo-
rum shopping can occur across international borders and, to that extent, is beyond the control of
any one nation').
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choices, 135 an obvious first step would be to enact into law the rec-
ommendation of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission that
would make the public record data in the computers of the bank-
ruptcy courts conveniently available to the public. 13 6 The Southern
District of New York's bankruptcy court website-containing all
documents filed in all bankruptcy cases before the court-is per-
haps an even more important step forward. 137
Markets need information to operate effectively, and the
market for reorganizations is no exception. If the legal process be-
comes sufficiently transparent, the parties to cases will make better
choices, and policymakers will be able to distinguish beneficial from
deleterious forum shopping and address the latter without inter-
fering with the former. If, on the other hand, parties and policy-
makers continue to grope blindly, they should expect to trigger ad-
ditional races to the bottom.
135. The potential for an informational "feedback" system to inform public policy has been
noted in the incorporation debate as well. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supro note 3, at 1457 ("Incorpora-
tion decisions serve as an automatic feedback mechanism that supplies information about the
relative attractiveness of various sets of rules.").
136. That recommendation was incorporated into the bankruptcy bills enacted by the House
and the Senate that now await conference. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 702 (1999); S. 625, 106th
Cong. § 604 (1999). However, the recommendation was emasculated by an amendment requested
by the Judicial Conference. That amendment makes the policy "subject to such appropriate pri-
vacy concerns and safeguards as the Judicial Conference of the United States may determine."
S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999). The Conference has announced no progress on that front since the
amendment and none seems likely in the near future.
137. http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/. Delaware's web site is not as helpful, but is considerably
better than those of other courts. http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/.
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APPENDIX
Data regarding the 188 emerging companies studied 3 8
Bank-
Initial ruptcy plan Name of
bankruptcy court of pon Emerging
filer initial fi- c
filing firmed ompany
Date Years Refiling
followed followed date
to
Revco Akron
NVR Alexan-dria
Southmark Atlanta
Tracor Holdings Austin
El Paso Electric Austin
BatonMMR Holding Rouge
Wang Boston
Laboratories
Servam/Service Bridge-
America port
Resorts Inter- Camden
national (1989) C
Trump Plaza Camden
Trump Castle Camden
Charles-ton
AM Interna-
tional (1982) Chicago
Envirodyne Chicago
Industries
UNR Industries Chicago
Cincin-
Eagle-Picher nati
Baldwin United Cincin-
nati
3/13/92 Revco D.S.
7/23/93 NVR
7/23/90 Southmark
12/27191 Tracor, Inc.
1/9/96 El Paso ElectricCompany
1118/92 MIR Holding
9121193 Wang Laboratories
ServamlService
6130193 America
8117/90 Resorts Interna-tional
511/92 Trump Plaza
515192 Trump Castle
5129197
2/20/00
6/30/99
4130198
2/20100
1118/95
2/20/00
6/30194
3/21194
2/20100
515195
5/31/89 Hallwood Industries 2/20/00
9/11/84 AM International, 5117193Inc.
12/17/93 Envirodyne Indus- 2/20/00tries
6/2/89 UNR Industries Inc. 2/20100
11/18/96 Eagle-Picher 2/20/00
Industries
3/18/86 PHL Corp 1/31193
138. Data is from Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 6.
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Great AmericanCommunica- Cincin- 12/7/93 Great Americantomni nati Communications 2/12/96 2.2
tions
Allied Stores/
Federated Cincin-Federte nin 1/10/92 Federated Stores 2/20/00 8.1Department nati
Stores
Cook United Cleveland 9/30/86 Cook United Inc. 4/22/87 0.6 4/22/87
(1984)
Sudbury Cleveland 8/18/92 Sudbury, Inc. 1/2/97 4.4
White Motor Cleveland 11/18/83 Northeast Ohio Axle, 2/20/00 16.3Inc.
Edgell Commu- Advanstar
nications / Cleveland 1/23/92 Communications, 1/23/95 3
New Century Inc.
Gulf USA Coeur
Gulf USA d'ene 6/29/95 Gulf USA Corp. 6/29/98 3
Greyhound Corpus Greyhound Lines, 11/2/94 3.2 11/2/94Christi 8/30/91 Inc.
Michigan
General Dallas 4/1/88 Michigan General 8/20/90 2.4 8/22/90
(1987) Corp.
Zale's Dallas 5/20/93 Zale Corp. 2/20/00 6.8
Southland Dallas 2/21/91 Southland 2/20/00 9
National Dallas 3/9/93 National Gypsum 5/15/95 2.2
Gypsum Co.
REPH Acquis-
tion (Republic Dallas 4/16/90 OrNda Healthcorp 1/30/97 6.8
Health Corp.)
Forum Group Dallas 4/2/92 Forum Group, Inc. 6/30/97 5.2
First City Dallas 5/16/95 First City Financial 2/20/00 4,8
Bancorporation Corp.
Pantera's Dallas 8/6/90 Pizza Inn, Inc. 2/20/00 9.5
NACO Finance Dallas 12/13/91 USTrails 2/20/00 8.2
First Republic Dallas 10/30/90 First Republic 10/30/93 3
Bank BankCorp
American American
Healthcare Dallas 10/6/89 Healthcare 4/19/94 4.5
Management
Gillett Holdings Denver 8/3/92 Gillett Holdings 2/20/00 7.6
Kaiser Steel Denver 9/23/88 Kaiser Steel 2/20/00 11.4Resources, Inc.
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Storage Denver
Storage Denver
Technology
Amdura Denver
McLouth Steel Detroit
Braniff Interna- Fort
tional (1982) Worth
Western Co. of Fort
North America Worth
Oxoco Houston
Continental
Airlines (1983)
National Con-
venience Stores
Buttes Gas & Houston
Oil Company
AppleTree Houston
Markets
General Homes Houston
Global Marine Houston
Dreco Energy Houston
Services
MG Holdings Indian-
apolis
Charter Jackson-
Co. ville
Fairfield Corn- Little
munities Rock
Standard Los
Brands Paint Angeles
Los An-Angeles Corp. geles
Leisure Ls
Technology Angeles
House of Los
Fabrics Angeles
6118/87 Storage Technology
9119191 Amdura Corp.
12/11/84 MLX Corp.
9/1183 Dalfort Corp.
2/20100
4/30195
9/29/95
1/31/89
3127189 Western Company of 4113195
10.8 9/29/95
5.4
G
4.1 1/18191
4.3 12/3/90
2.8
3/27/89 Western Company of 4/13195
North America
12/18/86 Ironstone Group 1/18191
9/2/86 Continental Airlines 12/3190
2124193 National Conven-ience Stores, Inc.
12/20/88 Buttes Gas & Oil 12198Company
9/29/92 AppleTree Markets 9/29/95
10/30/91 General Homes 10/30194
2/2/89 Global Marine, Inc. 2120/00
6113/85 Dreco Energy 9125/97Services, Ltd.
3/12/92 Mayflower Group 3131/95
12/19/86 Charter Co. 2J20/00
Fairfield Communi-ties Inc.
5/14/93 Standard Brands 12127/95
Paint
3/31/95 unknown 3/31/98
2/8/93 Leisure Technology 2/8196
7/10/96 House of Fabrics 4/30/98
12127/95
2001]
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3
3
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3
i
i
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Care Los 3/29/90 Care Enterprises, 4/30/94 4.1Enterprises Angeles Inc.
Commonwealth Los The Peregrine Real 2/20/00 5.5
Equity Trust Angeles Estate Trust
First Executive 8/17/92 First Lincoln 8/17/95 3
Angeles Holdings, Inc.
Carter Hawley LsHaler AnyLs 9/14/92 Carter Hawley Hale 10/11/95 3.1Hale Angeles
Smith Lsit a ALs 11/12/87 Smith International 2/20/00 12.3International Angeles
Los
Wickes Ls 9/21/84 Wickes Cos Inc. 2/20/00 15.4Angeles
Cardis
Mission Insur-
ance Group
Public Service
New Hampshire
EUA Power
Evans Products
Air Florida
Prime Motor
Inns
Radice
General
Development
Insilco
MGF Oil
Los
Angeles
Los
Angeles
Manches-
ter
Manches-
ter
Miami
Miami
Miami
Miami
Miami
Midland
Midland
11/27/89
5/9/90
4/20/90
5/23/94
7/2/86
8/7/86
4/3/92
4/14/89
3/27/92
11/23/92
12/2/87
Cardis Corp.
Danielson Holding
Corp.
Public Service Co. of
New Hampshire
Great Bay Power
Corp.
Grossman's Inc.
Jet Florida, Inc.
Prime Hospitality
Corp.
The Major Group,
Inc.
Atlantic Gulf
Communities Corp.
Insilco
MGF Oil Corp.
7/31/93
2/20/00
2/20/00
12/31/96
4/7/97
7/18/88
2/20/00
9/29/92
2/20/00
2/20/00
3/31/90
2.6
10.8 4/7/97
1.9
Value Mer-
chants/ Every- Milwau-
thing's A kee 6/15/95 Value Merchants 3/21/96 0.8 3/21/96
Dollar/ Toy
Liquidators
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B-E Holdings /
Bucyrus-Erie
Ladish
Enstar
Group/Enstar
Specialty Retail
Kinder Care
Gaylord Con-
tainer
Salant (1990)
JPS Textile
Group
Best Products
(1991)
Jamesway
Corp. (1993)
Lomas
Financial
(1989)
Tacoma Boat-
building (1985)
Lionel Corp.
(1982)
Towle
Manufacturing
Co. (1986)
Anglo Energy
(1983)
Penn-Dixie
Industries
(1980)
E-II Holdings
New York
12/1194
416193
B-E Holdings/
Bucyrus-Erie
Ladish Co.
Milwau-
kee
Milwau-
kee
Mont-
gomery
Mont-
gomery
New
Orleans
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
3/16/93
10/16/92
7/30/93
3/21/91
5/31/94
12/12/94
12/30/91
8/17/87
9/12/85
9/30/87
3/18/86
3/4/82
19A/QQ
Kinder-Care Learn-
ing Centers, Inc.
Gaylord Container
Corp.
Salant Corp.
JPS Textile Group
Best Products
Jamesway Corp.
Lomas Financial
Corp.
Tacoma Boatbuild-
ing
Lionel Corp.
Towle Mfg. Co.
Anglo Energy, Inc.
Continental Steel
Corp.
Astrum Interna-
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2/20100
4/6196
2/20100
2/20/00
12/29198
8/1197
9/24/96
10/18195
10/10195
2/24194
6/14191
8/25189
2/22/88
11/25/85
91flnilfnl
6.4
2.3
1.9
12/29/98
8/1J97
9124196
10/18/95
10110/95
2/24/94
6/14/91
8125189
2/22/88
11125185
Oxford Energy New York 8/17193 Oxford Tire Recy- 8117196 3
2/24/92 Enstar Group Inc. 2/24195 3
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FSC
FSC
Corp.
JWP
West Point
Acquisition
Ames Depart-
ment Stores
Vestron
Seatrain Lines
Eastern
Airlines
McLean
Industries
Allis-Chalmers
New York
New York
12/18/85
9/30/94
Trilos Corp.
EMCOR Group, Inc.
12/31/96
9/30/97
New York 9/4/92 Valley Fashion Corp. 2/20/00 7.5
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
12/18/92
7/3/91
3/30/87
12/22/94
5/16/89
10/31/88
Ames Department
Stores
Inovision
Seatrain
Eastern Airlines
Lancer Industries
Allis-Chalmers
Corp.
2/20/00 7.2
12/31/97
6/30/92
12/22/97
12/31/96
2/20/00
5.3
3
7.6
Integrated New York 8/8/94 Presidio Capital 12/31/99 5.4
Resources Corp.
Continental
Information New York 11/30/94 Continental 2/20/00 5.2
Systems Information Systems
Basix Corp. New York 10/20/89 Basix Corp 1/30/91 1.3
Gilbert/Robinson New York 9/15/92 Gilbert/Robinson 12/27/93 1.3
Orion Pictures New York 10/20/92 Orion Pictures 11/1/95 3
LTV New York 5/27/93 LTV Corp. 2/20/00 6.7
Seaman Seaman Furniture 2/20/00 7.4
Furniture Co. Co.
Coleco Ranger Industries,New York 1/31/90 2/20/00 10.1Industries Inc.
Hills Depart- New York 9/13/93 Hills Stores Co. 11/12/98 5.2
ment Stores
Manville New York 12/18/86 Schuller Corp. 2/20/00 13.2
Revere Copper New York 7/29/85 Revere Copper & 11/19/86 1.3
& Brass Brass
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U.S. Home New York 5/24193 U.S. Home Corp. 2120/00 6.7
Beker Indus- NewYork 10/G/88 Nu-%West Industries, 8/10195 6.8
tries Inc.
Petrolane New York 6125/93 Petrolane, Inc. 4119195 1.8
Alexander's Inc. New York 9/21193 Alexander's Inc. 2120100 6.4
New Valley
(Western Newark 11/1194 New Valley Corp. 2/20100 5.3
Union)
Emerson Radio Newark 3/31/94 Emerson Radio 2/20/00 5.9Corp.
Todd Shipyards Newark 12114/90 Todd Shipyards 2/20/00 9.2
O'Brien Envi- NRG Generating
ronmental Newark 1/18/96 (US) Inc. 2/20100 4.1
Energy
International
American Newark 8/12/92 Inernan 2/20/00 7.5
Homes American Homes
Hexcel Oakland 1/11195 Hexcel 2/20100 5.1
Spreckels Spreckels Indus-
Industries Oakland 814/93 tries! Yale Interna. 8124196 3.1tional Inc.
Texas Oklahoma 1/4/90 Phoenix Resource 3/27/9G 6.2
International City Companies, Inc.
Wilson Foods Oklahoma 3/28/84 Wilson Foods 10/17/88 4.6
(1983) City
Hadson Oklahoma 11/30/92 Hadson 12/31195 3.1
City
Circle K Phoenix 6/16/93 Circle K 5/30/96 3
Residential Phoenix 5/31/90 The Mortgage Trust 1231/93 3.6
Resources Corp.
America West P America West Air- 2/20/00 5.5
Airlines lines
Allegheny In- Pitts-tlleherntIn bu 7/12/90 Sunbeam-Oster Co. 2/20/00 9.6ternational burgh
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Wheeling- Pitts- Wheeling Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh burgh 12/18/90 Corp. 2/20/00 9.2
Steel
Americold Portland 6/19/95 Americold Corp. 7/31/98 3.1
Rose's Stores Raleigh 4/25/95 Rose's Stores 2/20/00 4.8
A.H. Robins Richmond 7/26/88 A.H. Robins 12/15/89 1.4
Al Copeland San America's Favorite 10/22/95 3
Enterprises Antonio Chicken
Intermark San Diego 6/4/93 Triton Group Ltd. 4/15/97 3.9
Nucorp Energy San Diego 12/20/85 Nucorp Energy 12/31/90 5
SanItel Corp. Francisco 3/22/83 Itel Corp. 2/20/00 16.9
Maxicare Santa 8/31/90 Maxicare Health 2/20/00 9.5Ana Plans
Centennial Santa Centennial Group 3 3
Group Ana Inc.
WTD Industries,
WTD Industries Seattle 11/23/92 changed to 9/27/99 6.8 9/27/99TreeSource Indus-
tries
TGX Shreve- 1/7/92 TGX Corp. 2/20/00 8.1port
Crystal Oil Shreve- 12/31/86 Crystal Oil Co. 2/20/00 13.1port
Jesup Group, South 8/10/92 Uniroyal Technology 2/20/00 7.5
The Bend Corp.
Interco St. Louis 6/25/92 Interco Inc. 2/20/00 7.7
TWA (1995) St. Louis 8/4/95 Trans World Airlines 2/20/00 4.6
Bicoastal Corp. Tampa 9/14/92 Bicoastal Corp. 9/14/95 3
Koger Tampa 12/8/93 Koger Equity, Inc. 2/20/00 6.2
Properties
Hillsborough Tampa 3/2/95 Walter Industries 2/20/00 5
Holdings
Doskocil Topeka 9/26/91 Doskocil Companies 3/25/97 5.5
American Car- Topeka 6/10/91 Anuhco, Inc. 2/20/00 8.7
riers
Calton Trenton 5/6/93 Calton, Inc. 2/20/00 6.8
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Lone Star WhiteInuStr Pain 2117194 Lone Star Industries 2/20100 6Industries Plains
Leaseway White 7/29/93 Leaseway 4/30/95 1.8
Transportation Plains Transportation
White
Texaco Plins 3123188 Texaco 2/20100 11.9lai
Grand Union Wilming- 5131/95 Grand Union Co. 6124198 3.1 6124/98
Company (1995) ton
Harvard Indus- Wilming- 8/10/92 Harvard Industries 518197 4.7 5/8197
tries ton
Westmoreland Wilming- 12/16/94 Westmoreland Coal 12/23/96 2 12123196
Coal (1994) ton Co.
Memorex Telex Wilming- 3/14/94 Memorex Telex 10/15/96 2.6 10/15196
(1994) ton
United
Merchants & Wilming- 8/15/91 United Merchants & 2/22196 4.5 2/22/96Mnfcueston ManufacturersManufacturers
TWA (1992) Wilming- 8/11/93 Trans World Airlines 6130195 1.9 6/30195ton
SPI Holding, timng 10/29/92 Spectravison Inc. 618195 2.6 6/8195
Inc.
(Spectradyne) ton
Cherokee Inc. Wilming- 6/1/93 Cherokee Inc. 11/7194 1.4 11/7194
(1993) ton
Memorex Telex Wilming- 2/7/92 Memorex Telex 211/94 2 2111194
(1992) ton
Phoenix Steel Wilming- 7/31/85 Phoenix Steel 4/20187 1.7 4/20/87ton
Wherehouse Wi'ing- 12/16/9G Wherehouse 2120100 3.2
Entertainment ton Entertainment, Inc.
Vista Properties Wiling- 9/19/95 Vista Properties 9/28/95 0ton
Lomas Finan- Wilming- 10/4/96 Siena Holdings, Inc. 2/20100 3.4
cial (1995) ton
Rexene Wilming- 7/7/92 Rexene Products 8/27/97 5.1ton
Continental Wilming- 4/16/93 Continental Airlines 2/20/00 6.9
Airlines (1990) ton Holdings, Inc.
Morrison Knud- Wilming- 8/26/96 Morrison Knudson 2/20100 3.5
sen ton
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Days Inns of Wilming- 12/18/92 Buckhead America 2/20/00 7.2
America ton Corp.
Columbia Gas Wilming- 11/15/95 Columbia Gas Sys- 2/20/00 4.3
System ton tem, Inc.
Bibb Company, Wilming- 9/12/96 Bibb Company 10/31/98 2.1
The ton
Anacomp, Inc. Wling- 5/20/96 Anacomp, Inc. 2/20/00 3.8ton
Ithaca Indus- Wilming- 11/22/96 Ithaca Industries 2/20/00 3.2
tries ton
UDC Homes Wilming- 10/3/95 UDC Homes 7/10/98 2.8
ton
Restaurant Wilming- 1/7/94 Family Restaurants,
Enterprises ton Inc. 2/20/00 6.1
Group
Kash N' Karry Wilming- 12/12/94 Kash N' Karry Food 12/18/96 2
Food Stores ton Stores
Charter Wilming- 7/8/92 Charter Medical 2/20/00 7.6
Medical ton Corp.
Resorts Inter- Wilming- 4/22/94 Griffin Gaming & 2/20/00 5.8
national (1994) ton Entertainment
DR Holdings/ Wilming- 6/24/93 DR Holdings/
Come ton Computervision
Computers
Edisto Wilming- 5/27/93 Edisto Resources 10/22/97 4.4
Resources ton
USG Corp. Wilming- 4/23/93 USG Corp. 2/20/00 6.8ton
AM Interna- Wilming- 9/29/93 AM International 2/20/00 6.4
tional (1993) ton
ing- 9/13/96n n SpectraVision 10/31/96 0.1
ton (liquidating)
Monarch Regal ReinsuranceWorcester 6/25/92 Co. and Sovereign 6/25/95 3Capital Realty Co.
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